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Causation Compared:
Facts, Fiction, Inferences and Legal 
Legitimacy
SARAH ARNELL*
An analysis of how the supreme courts in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom 
have dealt with evidential difficulties in establishing causation in tort/delict, where there 
is a gap in scientific knowledge which makes it impossible to say how an injury or disease 
occurred, highlights the different interpretations given to the “but for” test so central to 
the rules of causation in all three jurisdictions. These jurisdictions ostensibly apply the 
“but for” criterion as the primary test for determining causation. Material contribution to 
harm and increase in risk of harm each play a varying role in causation in each jurisdiction. 
Their role is determined by the way in which the “but for” test is applied. Particularly as 
between the United Kingdom, on one hand, and Canada and Australia, on the other, the 
application of the “but for” test varies significantly and results in a different outcome for 
the establishment of causation.  
In the last ten years it is perhaps the United Kingdom that has experienced the greatest 
difficulty in trying to cope with gaps in scientific knowledge. Of the three jurisdictions, 
the United Kingdom has applied more strictly the “but for” test. This historical strict 
application has brought difficulties when the Supreme Court in the United Kingdom 
(hereinafter: Supreme Court) has tried to introduce flexibility into the causal assessment. 
The Supreme Court has chosen to create a transparent looser test for causation in order to 
try to deal with evidential difficulties and gaps in scientific knowledge. This has been met 
with criticism and, partly as a result, the Supreme Court has restricted this looser test to 
cases where the injury suffered is mesothelioma. This is a special rule, or an exception to 
the general rule. The courts in Canada and Australia have not had to create such a clear 
exception to their general rule because their application of the “but for” test is less strict. 
Their application of the “but for” test involves a generous injection of what they term 
“common sense”. This in reality requires greater analysis, because risk is allowed to play 
a greater part in the causal assessment than is currently so in the United Kingdom and 
thereby admits of a flexibility to cope with evidential difficulties.
As part of the analysis of the different approaches, it is necessary to trace in detail how 
and why these approaches have developed. There is still scope for the Supreme Court to 
develop the rules on causation, and the role of risk is not yet settled. An analysis of the 
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approaches in these three jurisdictions allows the pros and cons for each approach to be 
carefully considered. Looking at the different jurisdictions highlights the strong influence 
of policy in this area of the law; there are lessons to be learned from the experiences of 
each. The purpose of delict/tort law needs to be borne in mind. The courts in Scotland and 
England have not generally embraced alternative, academically led thoughts and theories 
on the development of causation in their judgments, perhaps because these have been 
viewed by the judiciary as overly complicated.1 The Supreme Court withdrew from an 
initial attempt to develop rules on causation to meet the needs of tort law in the twenty-
first century. 
The arbitrary, unprincipled risk exception that has been carved out for mesothelioma 
cases,2 has been criticised for, inter alia, failing to have any proper legal basis and failing 
to have any proper legal justification for its limits. However the Canadian Supreme Court 
decision of Clements (Litigation Guardian of) v Clements3 could perhaps provide a valid 
principled basis for the restriction of the risk exception, set as it is in Clements, within the 
traditional “but for” test. The Canadian approach allows risk to play a part in the causal 
assessment by virtue of the role it plays in the drawing of factual inferences. It is suggested 
that the Supreme Court, if not persuaded by academic discussion, might be persuaded by 
its counterparts in Canada and Australia. There are elements from each jurisdiction that 
the Supreme Court may wish to adopt.
SCOTLAND AND ENGLAND
Traditional Test for Causation 
In Scotland and in England the causal requirement that must be satisfied in order to make a 
successful claim in delict/tort has historically been that the breach of duty by the defender/
defendant must be the causa sine qua non; in other words, it is the cause, but for which the 
injury would not have happened.4 However, this “but for” test is merely the starting point. 
The causal requirement can be satisfied not only when the negligence of the defender/
defendant has caused the injury which is the subject of the delictual/tortious action, in 
the sense of the wrongful act being the dominant cause, but also where the wrongful 
act has materially contributed to the injury. This was established long before Bonnington 
Castings Ltd v Wardlaw,5 although Bonnington Castings is normally taken as authority for 
this proposition and as the starting point in any discussion on causation within the law of 
delict/tort, particularly in cases of industrial disease.6
In the case of Bonnington Castings, the injury which was the subject of the tortious 
action was the disease pneumoconiosis which resulted from the breathing in of air that 
1 See Martin Hogg, “Developing Causal Doctrine”, in Richard Goldberg, Perspectives on Causation (2011). 
2 See the case of Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd and Willmore v Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council [2011] UKSC 
10; [2011] 2 WLR 523, below.
3 Clements (Litigation Guardian of) v Clements 2012 SCC 32.  
4 See for example the case of McWilliams v Sir William Arrol &Co and Lithgows Ltd 1962 SC (HL) 70.
5 Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613. See for example the cases of Wakelin v London and South 
Western Railway Co (1886) 12 App Cas 41 at 47 per Lord Watson and Craig v Glasgow Corporation 1919 SC(HL) 1 
at 6 per Lord Buckmaster.
6 See, for example, Lord Rodger in the case of Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd, Fox v Spousal (Midlands) 
Ltd, Matthews v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1978) Ltd [2002] 3WLR 89 at para. 129.
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contained silica dust. Pneumoconiosis is a cumulative disease; each exposure contributes 
to the disease. The evidence showed that the pursuer had been exposed to two sources of 
silica dust; dust from the operation of the pneumatic hammer and dust from the operation 
of the swing grinders. The defenders were found to be in breach of their duty of care in 
relation to the dust from the swing grinders only. Lord Reid looked at what was meant by 
a material contribution. He felt that any contribution that did not fall within the exception 
de minimis non curat lex must be material. It was held by the House of Lords that the swing 
grinders had contributed an amount of dust that was not negligible and therefore had 
materially contributed to this cumulative disease.
The test for satisfying causation is therefore more generous than the “but for” test.7 
The “but for” test alone requires more than the material contribution requirement, 
when you take into account the definition of material contribution by Lord Reid in 
Bonnington Castings. Taking Bonnington Castings as an example, the pursuer did not need 
to establish that “but for” the dust from the swing grinders, he would not have developed 
pneumoconiosis. All he needed to prove was that the dust from the swing grinders was 
more than a negligible contribution to the disease.8 However, the material contribution 
test in the United Kingdom has increasingly been seen as only appropriate with respect to 
cumulative divisible diseases or harm.9
Relaxation in the Test
In certain types of delictual/tortious action there has been what effectively amounts to a 
relaxation in the traditional causal requirements. This was clearly established in the case of 
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd, Fox v Spousal (Midlands) Ltd, Matthews v Associated 
Portland Cement Manufactures (1978) Ltd10 which developed a principle, the foundations 
of which had first been laid down in the case of McGhee v National Coal Board.11 In the 
subsequent case of Barker v Corus Ltd Murray v British Shipbuilders (Hydrodynamics) Ltd 
and Others, Patterson v Smiths Dock Ltd and another12 there was however a move away from 
framing the relaxation in terms of causation and a move towards creating a new head of 
liability. The type of action to which this appeared to be relevant was one where the injury 
or harm sustained was a non-cumulative disease, there was more than one source of the 
harmful agent (whether that source was employers; specific source within one employer; 
7 Lord Rodger sees the test for causation in Wardlaw as more generous than the “but for” test - see Lord Rodger 
in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd, Fox v Spousal (Midlands) Ltd, Matthews v Associated Portland Cement 
Manufacturers (1978) Ltd [2002] 3WLR 89 at para 129 and in the case Barker v Corus UK Ltd, Murray v British 
Shipbuilders (Hydrodynamics) Ltd and Others, Patterson v Smiths Dock Ltd and another [2006] 2 AC 572 at para 72.
8 Lord Rodger in Fairchild, ibid.
9 See for example Robert O’Leary, “Balance of Probability or Material Contribution? Establishing Causation in 
Occupational Cancer Claims”, Journal of Public Interest Law, I (2013), p. 19; and the case of Jones v Secretary of State 
for Energy and Climate Change [2012] EWHC 2936 (QB). Cf Bailey v Ministry of Defence [2009] 1 WLR 1052, a case 
of medical negligence which involved an indivisible injury; and Lord Phillips’ view of the material contribution 
test in the case of  Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd and Willmore v Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council [2011] UKSC 
10; [2011] 2 WLR 523, and its appropriate use in indivisible diseases such as lung cancer. See further below for 
a discussion of material contribution generally. 
10 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd, Fox v Spousal (Midlands) Ltd, Matthews v Associated Portland Cement 
Manufacturers (1978) Ltd [2002] UKHL 22, [2002] 3WLR 8.
11 McGhee v National Coal Board 1973 SC(HL) 37; 1973 SLT 14.
12 Barker v Corus UK Ltd, Murray v British Shipbuilders (Hydrodynamics) Ltd and Others, Patterson v Smiths Dock 
Ltd and another [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572.
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or otherwise), and as a result of the constraints of scientific knowledge, it could not be 
determined which source caused the disease. 
In the case of McGhee, although there was one possible cause of the harm (dermatitis) – 
brick dust, there were two possible sources of the harm. The first source of harm was one 
for which the defenders were not liable: working in hot and dusty conditions; and there 
was the potential source of harm for which the defenders were liable; a failure to provide 
showers at the end of the day. The medical evidence at that time could not determine 
exactly how the dermatitis was caused. It could have begun with a single abrasion of 
the horny layer of the skin, or it could have been caused by an accumulation of minor 
abrasions. So it was possible that the disease was non-cumulative. If that were so, the 
dermatitis could have been caused by working in the hot and dusty conditions or it could 
have occurred when the pursuer cycled home caked in grime and sweat because of an 
inability to shower. It could not therefore be proven that the failure to provide showers 
had caused or materially contributed to the dermatitis. There was, however, evidence that 
this failure had added materially to the risk that the dermatitis might develop. The House 
of Lords held that, under the circumstances, to materially increase the risk of injury was 
the same as making a material contribution to the injury, and the defendants were found 
liable. Key parts of the judgments of Lords Reid, Simon, and Salmon demonstrate this 
approach.
Lord Reid in McGhee states that in the type of case that McGhee is, that is, it is not 
possible scientifically to say how the disease begins, so that it may be non-cumulative, a 
broader view of causation must be taken. He states:
Nor can I accept the distinction drawn by the Lord Ordinary between materially 
increasing the risk that the disease will occur and making a material contribution 
to its occurrence …
There may be some logical ground for such a distinction where our knowledge of 
all the material factors is complete … From a broad and practical viewpoint I can 
see no substantial difference between saying that what the defender did materially 
increased the risk of injury to the pursuer and saying that what the defender did 
made a material contribution to his injury.13
Lord Simon stated that in his view “a failure to take steps which would bring about a 
material reduction of the risk, involves, in this type of case, a substantial contribution to 
the injury”.14
Lord Salmon stated:
In the circumstances of the present case it seems to me unrealistic and contrary 
to ordinary common sense to hold that the negligence which materially increased 
the risk of injury did not materially contribute to causing the injury … In the 
circumstances of the present case, the possibility of a distinction existing between 
(a) having materially increased the risk of contracting the disease, and (b) having 
materially contributed to causing the disease may no doubt be a fruitful source 
of academic discussions between students of philosophy. Such a distinction is 
however, far too unreal to be recognised by the common law.15
13 McGhee per Lord Reid at  22.
14 McGhee per Lord Simon at 24.
15 McGhee per Lord Salmon at 26.
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It is difficult to draw a clear picture of Lord Wilberforce’s argument, other than the fact 
that he felt there should be a reversal of the burden of proof where there was an evidential 
difficulty created by the lack of scientific knowledge, so that it should be the defender who 
suffers the consequences of the impossibility of saying what the precise cause was, rather 
than the pursuer,16 but the statements made by Lords Reid, Simon and Salmon are clear 
and create a majority opinion.17
The seeds sown in McGhee were harvested in Fairchild. Lord Bingham in Fairchild drew 
from McGhee that the ratio of that case was, under the circumstances of this type of case, no 
distinction was to be drawn between making a material contribution to causing the disease 
and materially increasing the risk of the pursuer contracting it.18 He saw the orthodox test 
of causation as being adapted, but nonetheless the causal requirement was rooted in the 
requirement that the negligence materially contributed to the harm. 
In the case of Fairchild the claimants had contracted mesothelioma through exposure 
to asbestos dust and fibres whilst they each worked for a number of different employers. 
At the time, it was thought that mesothelioma could be caused by a single fibre and that 
it was a non-cumulative disease.19 However, it was then and still is now the case that each 
exposure to the harmful agent increases the risk that the particular exposure will cause 
the disease. At the time of Fairchild, it was thought that each exposure did not contribute 
cumulatively to the disease. Although this has since been questioned, how asbestos fibres 
cause mesothelioma is still not fully understood. There is no way of identifying the source of 
the fibres instigating the genetic changes that result in the malignant tumour. The problem 
for the claimants in Fairchild therefore was that there was no way of establishing that any 
one negligent employer had caused the mesothelioma or had even materially contributed 
to the disease. The House of Lords held unanimously that the appellants should be allowed 
to recover damages for the breaches of duty because, in the particular circumstances 
of the cases, to be able to prove on a balance of probabilities that the defendants had 
materially increased the risk of the employees contracting mesothelioma, where it was 
not scientifically possible to establish exactly which defendant’s or defendants’ exposure 
was the cause of the harm, was sufficient to establish the necessary causal requirements. 
The majority of the Law Lords felt that this type of case called for an alteration of the 
traditional requirements necessary to establish causation20 or at least a broad view to be 
taken of causation.21 They relied heavily on the decision in McGhee. 
That the traditional requirement of causation was relaxed in Fairchild is clear. What was 
not clear was any majority basis for this relaxation.22 The four Law Lords who supported 
this relaxation fell into two camps. Lords Bingham and Rodger, following the path begun 
by McGhee, took a material increase in risk as amounting to a material contribution. Lord 
16 Lord Rodger in Barker stated diplomatically at para 76,  that Lord Wilberforce “wrapped up his conclusion 
in less distinct language”.
17 Lord  Kilbrandon dissented.
18 Three members of the House, Lords Reid, Simon and Salmon, had expressly said this.
19 The single fibre theory has been discredited. It is now believed that causation may involve a cumulative 
effect with later exposure contributing to causation initiated by an earlier exposure. For more information on 
mesothelioma, see the annex to Lord Phillips judgement in the case of Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd [2011] UKSC 
10, [2011] 2 AC 229. 
20 See the judgments of Lords Bingham, Nicholls, and Hoffmann.
21 See the judgment of Lord Rodger.
22 See S. Arnell, “Causation Reassessed”,  Scots Law Times (2002), p. 265.
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Nicholls and Hoffmann, on the other hand, went down a different route. They did not link 
a material increase in risk of contracting the disease with a material contribution to the 
disease. They preferred to say simply that negligent actions materially increasing the risk 
of contracting mesothelioma satisfied the causal connection. Lord Bingham concluded,
Where those conditions are satisfied,23 it seems to me just and in accordance with 
common sense to treat the conduct of A and B in exposing C to a risk to which he 
should not have been exposed as making a material contribution to the contracting 
by C of a condition against which it was the duty of A and B to protect him.24
His decision was based on justice and on what he saw as the correct interpretation of 
McGhee.
Lord Rodger agreed with Lord Bingham’s judgment. He too relied heavily on McGhee 
and backed this up with the attainment of justice. He saw McGhee as taking a broad view of 
causation. It was still necessary to show that the wrongful act had materially contributed 
to the injury, but the court looked at what was necessary in this particular case to prove 
the material contribution. In this particular case it was enough that the risk was increased. 
Lord Rodger justified the element of rough justice that results from the application of 
McGhee, that is, a defender may be found liable when in fact his wrongdoing did not 
cause the harm. The alternative is injustice to the claimants who would have no claim 
otherwise. These claimants did nothing wrong, whilst the defendants are all in breach of 
their duty of care, by exposing the men to a risk of developing mesothelioma, which risk 
did eventuate.25 Lord Rodger therefore held that: 
by proving that the defendants individually materially increased the risk that the 
men would develop mesothelioma due to inhaling asbestos fibres, the claimants 
are taken in law to have proved that the defendants materially contributed to their 
illness.26
By contrast, Lord Hoffmann interpreted McGhee as stating that materially increasing the 
risk that the disease would occur, in the particular circumstances of that case, was enough 
to satisfy the causal requirements for liability. He accepted that passages in the judgments 
in McGhee suggest that materially increasing the risk is to be treated as equivalent to 
materially contributing to the injury. However, he pointed out that this is precisely what 
the doctors would not say. So he takes it therefore that what the members of the House in 
McGhee meant when they said there was no distinction between materially increasing the 
risk and materially contributing to the disease, was that, in the particular circumstances, a 
breach of duty which materially increased the risk should be treated as if it had materially 
contributed to the disease. He said that he would prefer not to resort to such “legal fictions”. 
He would rather decouple material increase in risk from material contribution and treat 
material increase in risk standing alone, as sufficient to satisfy the causal requirements for 
liability. Similarly, Lord Nicholls felt that it should be recognised openly that the court is 
applying a different and less stringent test. He did not link this with material contribution. 
23 Lord Bingham is here referring to the conditions in para. 2 of his judgment. 
24 Fairchild per Lord Bingham at para. 34.
25 Lord Rodger also derived support for his decision from other legal systems.
26 Fairchild per Lord Rodger at para. 168.
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He said the House in McGhee “departed from the usual threshold ‘but for’ test of causal 
connection and treated a lesser degree of causal connection as sufficient”.27  
It should be noted that the fifth Law Lord, Lord Hutton, took a different view of McGhee, 
believing that the decision was reached by drawing an inference from the facts rather than 
a new principle of law being developed. However, he did conclude that the breach of duty 
by each defendant materially increasing the risk of the onset of mesothelioma involved a 
substantial contribution to the disease suffered by the claimants. He thereby linked the 
material increase in risk with material contribution, as did Lords Bingham and Rodger. 
Ultimately, Lord Hutton believed that a legal inference should be drawn in these types of 
cases, rather than a new principle being formulated, so that an increase in risk is sufficient 
to say that the act made a material contribution. 
This split in the underlying basis for the relaxation in causation requirements in a 
Fairchild type of case left the development of this area of the law uncertain. The House 
of Lords could have chosen one of three bases for allowing causation to be established in 
these type of cases, as they are all evident in either McGhee or Fairchild – 
(1) a clear relaxation in the rules of causation, where a material increase in risk created 
by the wrongdoer is sufficient to establish causation (Lord Hoffman and Lord Nicholls); or 
(2) a common sense application of the material contribution to harm test, where in 
these types of cases, a material increase in risk will in law be taken to amount to a material 
contribution, either through the drawing of a legal inference (Lord Hutton), or through the 
creation of a new principle (Lord Bingham and Lord Rodger); or 
(3) a common sense application of the causation rules, which includes the material 
contribution test, which allows an inference on the facts to be drawn in the circumstances, 
to say that a material contribution to the harm was made by the wrongdoer (a factual 
inference) (Lord Hutton’s interpretation in Fairchild, of McGhee). 
The House of Lords in the case of Barker v Corus UK Ltd28 chose to be transparent. It 
opted for the clear relaxation in the rules of causation, but then chose to reshape the angle 
from which these types of cases are approached.29 Lord Hoffmann took the opportunity 
in the case of Barker to take the law down his own interpretative path. He did this by 
reinterpreting Lord Bingham’s judgment in Fairchild so that he could align it with his own 
judgment in Fairchild and with Lord Nicholl’s judgment. Having chiselled out what he 
sees as a ratio from Fairchild, he applied it to the case of Barker and used it, along with the 
professed attainment of justice, to reformulate the liability itself. It is no longer liability 
for causing or materially contributing to harm or injury. It becomes liability for materially 
increasing the risk of exposing the claimant to harm or injury. This finally allowed the 
House of Lords to hold that liability in this type of case is, out of fairness, several only, not 
joint and several. This means that liability can be divided between the defendants relative 
27 See Fairchild per Lord Nicholls at para 44. It is not clear that Lord Nicholls appreciated that the Wardlaw test 
of  material contribution to the harm is not in fact the “but for” test.
28 Barker v Corus UK Ltd, Murray v British Shipbuilders (Hydrodynamics) Ltd and Others, Patterson v Smiths Dock 
Ltd and another  [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572.
29 There was no need for the House of Lords to go to the lengths of using the 1966 Practice Statement because 
they did not have to overrule a previous decision. They merely developed the point begun in Fairchild, but 
in developing it, they also changed tact slightly and were able to do this because there was no clear ratio in 
Fairchild. By reinterpreting Lord Bingham’s judgment in Fairchild, the House in Barker produced a clear ratio and 
thereby provided a foundation for their ultimate judgment.
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to their degree of contribution to that risk. The Law Lords feel that this helps to smooth the 
rough justice that results from joint and several liability; that is, there would be one or more 
defendants who had not actually caused the injury and yet were having to pay possibly 
full damages. The Compensation Act 2006 ultimately restored joint and several liability, 
but the clear creation of a new rule of causation where an increase in risk is sufficient to 
establish causation, was untouched by Parliament. It is interesting to consider whether in 
hindsight the Law Lords would have opted for this basis of liability, had they known that 
their ultimate goal of several liability would be hijacked by Parliament.
Reformulation of Fairchild 
In Barker, as in Fairchild, there were a number of different employers over the course of the 
claimants’ working life. The disease contracted by the employees was mesothelioma. Unlike 
Barker, there was in this case a period of self-employment during which the employee was 
exposed to asbestos. This aspect emphasised the injustice to the defendants that can arise 
in cases such as these. It was conceivable that the exposure to asbestos took place during 
this period of self-employment and that accordingly no employer was actually responsible 
for the mesothelioma that resulted.  
Lord Hoffmann in Barker began his slow reformulation of the law left by Fairchild by 
formulating two questions which he said had been left undecided by Fairchild: first, what 
were the limits of the Fairchild exception? Did the causal agent have to be the same? Did 
each exposure have to involve a breach of duty of care by employers? Second, what was 
the extent of liability? The answers to these two questions are interlinked. Perhaps partly 
because of the answer arrived at by the House of Lords to the first question, the House 
answered the second question as they did.
With reference to the first question, the House of Lords held in Barker that the exposures 
did not all have to be a result of a breach of duty to “qualify” for application of the Fairchild 
exception. It should be recalled that in McGhee the brick dust to which the pursuer was 
exposed whilst working in the kilns was not a wrongful exposure. The House in Barker 
went as far as to hold that even where the employee was himself responsible for a material 
exposure, the Fairchild exception could still apply.
In dealing with the second question Lord Hoffmann introduced the idea that the 
damage caused in a Fairchild type of case is the creation of a risk that the claimant will 
contract the disease rather than the contraction of the disease itself. He is critical of Moses 
J at first instance, proceeding on the basis that each employer should be deemed to have 
caused the disease and therefore that they be jointly and severally liable for this indivisible 
injury. Yet this is exactly the approach taken in McGhee and by Lords Bingham and Rodger 
in Fairchild. Lord Hoffmann says that this approach would have been acceptable if the 
House in Fairchild had proceeded on the “fiction” that a defendant who had created a 
material risk of mesothelioma was deemed to have caused or materially contributed to the 
contraction of the disease, but that actually the House in Fairchild was quite open in saying 
that creation of a material risk was sufficient for liability. He referred to his own judgment 
and that of Lord Nicholls, which admittedly do take this more radical position. But he also 
represented Lord Bingham as taking this view, with Lord Rodger and Hutton as the only 
two Law Lords who did not. In his argument for Lord Bingham taking this view, Lord 
Hoffmann refers to the following part of Lord Bingham’s judgment,
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Lord Wilberforce, in one of the passages of his opinion in McGhee … wisely 
deprecated resort to fictions and it seems to me preferable, in the interests of 
transparency, that the courts’ response to the special problem presented by cases 
such as these should be stated explicitly.30
Lord Hoffmann quoted this passage out of context. If that excerpt is taken with the rest 
of what Lord Bingham said, it can be seen that Lord Bingham was saying that he cannot 
follow or agree with what Lord Hutton says about McGhee, that it was based on drawing 
a factual or legal inference . He said that he preferred to recognise that the ordinary 
approach to the proof of causation is varied rather than to resort to the drawing of legal 
inferences. The drawing of legal inferences was what he saw as a fiction. His judgment, 
though, is basically that a material increase in risk is treated as amounting to a material 
contribution. This is much more anchored onto material contribution than the reasoning 
of Lord Nicholls or Lord Hoffmann.
Lord Rodger in Barker was critical of Lord Hoffmann’s interpretation of Lord Bingham’s 
judgment in Fairchild. He accepted that the problem in Fairchild could have been analysed 
in such a way as to say that the creation of a material risk was sufficient to satisfy the 
causation requirements in that type of case, but he stressed that it was not so analysed in 
Fairchild. He stated that “By adopting the proposed analysis your Lordships are not so 
much reinterpreting as rewriting the key decisions in McGhee [1973] 1 WLR 1 and Fairchild 
[2003] 1 AC 32”.31 Having presented this rather distorted interpretation of Fairchild, Lord 
Hoffmann stated that the quantification of chances was by no means unusual in the courts 
and that sometimes the law has treated the loss of a chance of a favourable outcome as 
compensatable damage in itself.32 Although the House in their decision in Gregg v Scott33 
rejected the possibility of liability for the loss of a chance being introduced into personal 
injury claims, Lord Hoffmann insisted that this decision was not because there was any 
conceptual objection to treating the loss of a chance or as he also put it, the increase in 
the risk of an unfavourable outcome, as actionable damage. He explained the refusal to 
adopt such a rule in Gregg v Scott on the basis that to have done so would have applied 
the Fairchild exception to all cases of medical negligence and would have been inconsistent 
with the case of Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority.34 He did not see Gregg v Scott as 
any kind of bar to him recognising a claim for the increase in the risk of an unfavourable 
outcome (or turned around, loss of a chance) in a Fairchild type case. Lord Hoffmann then 
turned to fairness and justice to bolster his argument for several liability.35 Lord Hoffmann 
therefore effectively managed to retract from the significant development of the law of 
causation in Fairchild so that the emphasis moved to liability: liability of the defendants is 
for the creation of a risk of injury in relation to which they have a duty of care to prevent 
30 Fairchild per Lord Bingham at para. 35.
31 Barker per Lord Rodger at para. 71.
32 Lord Hoffmann referred to the cases Chaplin v Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786 and Kitchen v Royal Air Force Association 
[1958] 1 WLR 563 as evidence that the loss of a favourable outcome can be compensatable damage in itself. In 
contract law damages may be awarded for the loss of a chance.
33 Gregg v Scott [2005] UKHL 2.
34 Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074. In this case there were a number of different possible 
agents that could have caused the injury. There was no evidence that the wrongful agent was more likely to 
have caused the injury than any of the other four candidates. Causation was not found to be established. 
35 Analysis of several liability is beyond the scope of this article, which is concerned with causation.
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the employee being so injured and the employee is in fact so injured. The focus moved 
from the relaxation of causation rules to the extent of the liability.
Lord Scott in Barker, like Lord Hoffmann, understood Fairchild to impose liability 
because the defendants had materially increased the risk of contracting the disease, rather 
than because they had materially contributed to the mesothelioma, which he also referred 
to as a “fiction”. This is despite the fact that those parts of the judgements of Lords Rodger 
and Bingham that he referred to in support of this clearly show that these judges saw the 
material increase in risk in Fairchild as being deemed to amount to materially contributing 
to the illness.36 Lord Scott also emphasised the exceptional nature of the Fairchild type of 
case. There was a causative difficulty which did not exist in Gregg v Scott. The Fairchild 
principle does not apply to all types of cases. The liability is for contributing to the risk 
of the eventual outcome. If the victim does not contract the disease, there is no claim 
for simply the trauma of being subjected to the risk, which has been clarified in Gregg v 
Scott. Lord Scott reasons that since Fairchild is an anomalous exception to the causation 
principles of tortious liability, it is not surprising if other principles of tortious liability 
have to be adjusted.
Lord Walker agreed with the judgment of Lord Hoffmann. He began by stating that the 
principle established or affirmed by Fairchild was as follows:
A defendant who is under a duty to protect a worker from the risk associated with 
a single noxious agent, and who breaches that duty by exposing the worker to that 
very risk, may be held liable even though the worker cannot (on the traditional “but-
for” test) prove that his ensuing disease was caused by that exposure. Exposing the 
claimant (or the deceased worker whose personal representative is the claimant) to 
the risk of injury is in this situation equated with causing his injury.37 
Lord Walker described this as an explicit variation of the ordinary requirement as to 
causation. He then moved away from equating exposing the claimant to the risk of injury 
to the causing of an injury, and stated that, as he had already noted (which seems slightly 
inaccurate), Fairchild was decided not on the fictional basis that the defendants should 
be treated as having caused the employee’s damage, but on the factual basis that they 
had wrongfully exposed him to the risk of damage. Because risk is something that can be 
divided and apportioned, this approach allowed him to opt for several liability rather than 
joint and several liability. Fairness to the employers was his overriding reason for taking 
this approach. Following Lord Scott, he excused the “radical” solution of basing liability 
on the exposure of a risk because it is in line with the radical departure that was made in 
Fairchild.
Baroness Hale aligned herself with Lords Hoffmann and Walker. However, she also 
agreed with Lord Rodger’s dissenting judgment that the damage in this type of action is 
the mesothelioma and not the risk of contracting mesothelioma. She felt that although the 
harm may be indivisible, the contribution to the risk can be divided. It is for this that the 
defendants are being made liable, so there is a sensible basis for apportioning liability. A 
sensible basis there may be, but Baroness Hale failed to provide any real legal basis. She 
said that this is a policy question, and so for her, sense and fairness have the upper hand 
36 See Barker per Lord Scott at para. 52 where he quotes from para. 34 of Lord Bingham’s judgment in Fairchild; 
and from para. 168 of Lord Rodger’s judgement in Fairchild. 
37 Barker per Lord Walker at para. 104.
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over precedent and certainty. As she rightly stated, liability was originally placed on such 
employers because it was thought fair to do so. And now we have fairness directing the 
scope of their liability. Historically, the Law Lords have felt that tort is an area where 
justice as fairness is more important than certainty.38 The excessive use of fairness to make 
radical departures from the general legal principles in a particular area of the law can be 
disconcerting, however, and reduces confidence in the legal process. Policy has always 
played an important role in shaping the development of the law of tort/delict. Here we see 
policy in the shape of justice as fairness not only leading to a departure from established 
law on causation, but then also reshaping that original departure. However, as Morgan 
pointed out, corrective justice is not the only way to analyse these issues.39 Other policy 
considerations were not considered.40
The majority of Law Lords in Barker referred often to the “fiction” in Fairchild. Yet 
it is the fiction of Lord Hoffmann’s interpretation of Fairchild that they followed. Only 
Lord Rodger accurately presented the decision in Fairchild. Lord Rodger disputed Lord 
Hoffmann’s assertion that in Fairchild the majority did not see that a material increase in 
risk was deemed to amount to materially contributing to the injury. He accepted that Lord 
Hoffmann himself did not (because of what Lord Hoffmann said in his own judgement 
in Fairchild) but disputed that Lord Bingham did not. He referred to that part of Lord 
Bingham’s judgement41 which encapsulated Bingham’s approach of anchoring material 
increase in risk to materially contributing to injury. Lord Rodger also pointed out that the 
appeals in Fairchild were argued on the basis that the defendants caused the men’s death 
and that was how they were dealt with by the Law Lords. Lord Rodger accepted that Lord 
Nicholl’s judgment did not equate material increase in risk with materially contributing, 
but he did point out that, on the other hand, there was nothing to suggest that Lord Nicholl 
considered the damage to be the creation of a risk. Lord Rodger correctly stated42 that 
when you look at Lord Bingham’s speech in Fairchild and his own (he agreed with Lord 
Bingham), one cannot say that the majority in Fairchild went down the “material risk 
would suffice for causation/ liability” road. Lord Rodger not only accurately presented 
the Fairchild decision but he considered the practical reason why McGhee and Fairchild 
were decided as they were. He felt that the reasoning indicated a desire on the part of the 
House to minimise disruption to the area of the law that is personal injury law and to try to 
maintain a consistency of approach. Under that law, victims recover damages because the 
wrongful act has materially contributed to their harm, not because it has created a risk that 
they would suffer harm. He questioned whether it should be the court system, rather than 
Parliament, that ameliorated the rough justice that results from the decision in Fairchild.
38 See for example Lord Reid and the majority of the active Law Lords from between 1972-73. Alan Paterson, 
The Law Lords (1982), p. 175.
39 Jonathan Morgan, “Causation, Politics and Law: The English and Scottish Asbestos Saga,” in Goldberg, note 
1 above.
40 Ibid.
41 Barker per Lord Rodger at para. 80 – where he referred to paragraph 34 of Lord Bingham’s judgment in 
Fairchild.
42 Barker per Lord Rodger at  para. 83. 
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Compensation Act 2006
As it turned out, Lord Rodger’s words about Parliament were prescient. The Compensation 
Act 2006 came into force in July 2006. Section 3, which is the only substantive section 
relevant here, was to be treated as having always had effect. It applied to England and 
Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. For all claims settled on or after 3 May 2006, where 
a defender/defendant is found liable for negligently exposing the pursuer/plaintiff to 
asbestos, whether by reason of having materially increased a risk or for any other reason, 
the defender/defendant shall be liable for the whole of the consequent damage and jointly 
and severally liable with any other defenders/defendants. Parliament therefore decided that 
the wrongdoers and their insurers rather than the claimant should bear the inconvenience 
of pursuing a number of wrongdoers for their share of the financial compensation and also 
the risk of insolvency of a wrongdoer or his insurer in this particular area of reparation 
law. The Compensation Act 2006 also arguably overruled the decision in Barker that the 
liability in these types of cases is for the increase in risk of injury.43 If Barker is overruled, 
we go back to Fairchild with its variety of potential bases for a relaxation in the rules of 
causation, and also therefore to McGhee.
The Supreme Court did not take the opportunity to re-evaluate the basis for the looser 
test for causation in the next relevant case that came before it, Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd and 
Willmore v Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council.44 The radical nature of the basis for which 
the Supreme Court opted meant that they have restricted this looser test for causation to 
mesothelioma cases. There has been no focus on a common sense application of the rules 
on causation; no resort to the drawing of legal inferences or factual inferences, which in the 
long term, when we look at Canada and Australia, might have allowed greater flexibility 
in the application of the rules on establishing causation and a more subtle use of risk 
in establishing causation, without a significant departure from the traditional rules. This 
might have allowed greater flexibility with less criticism because it would have allowed 
the application of the traditional rules on causation without the requirement to make a 
unprincipled exception for mesothelioma cases that does not survive legal scrutiny.  
Cautious Retraction to Mesothelioma Cases
The decision in the combined cases of Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd and Willmore v Knowsley 
Metropolitan Borough Council45 indicated two things. First, that there was no clear agreement 
within the Supreme Court on what should be required to establish causation; and second, 
that although the Fairchild exception was actually extended even further, it was clear from 
obiter remarks that a number of the Justices did not favour such a relaxed approach beyond 
mesothelioma cases. In fact, there was definite support for a move back to the traditional 
“but for” and material contribution tests in almost every other situation.
43 Lord Hoffmann saw it this way – see Rt. Hon. Lord Hoffmann, “Causation” in  Richard Goldberg, Perspectives 
on Causation (2011), p. 8.
44 Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd and Willmore v Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council [2011] UKSC 10; [2011] 2 
WLR 523.
45 Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd and Willmore v Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council [2011] UKSC 10; [2011] 2 
WLR 523.
JCL 8:1           75
s arnell
In the first case the claimant’s mother, Mrs. Costello, had died of mesothelioma by the 
time the case was before the Court. Her mother had been exposed to asbestos dust during 
the course of her employment with the defendant’s predecessor. She had also been exposed 
to a low level of asbestos in the general atmosphere. The judge at first instance dismissed 
the claim in damages against the defendant. He applied the doubles the risk test for 
causation that had been applied by the Court of Appeal in the case of Novartis Grimsby Ltd 
v Cookson. 46 He held that although the defendant had been in breach of either its statutory 
or common law duty towards Mrs. Costello throughout her employment between 1966 
and 1984, the tortious exposure was modest compared with the environmental exposure 
and had increased the risk of her contracting the disease by a very specific 18%. Mrs. 
Costello had not therefore established that on a balance of probabilities, the defendant’s 
tortious exposure had more than doubled the risk of Mrs. Costello contracting the disease. 
The Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by the claimant, holding that the doubles the 
risk test could not be applied to mesothelioma cases because of the development of the 
common law in that area and Section 3 of the Compensation Act 2006. For mesothelioma 
cases, causation was established by proof of a material increase in risk.
In the second case the claimant’s wife, who had died of mesothelioma, had been exposed 
to asbestos fibres while a pupil at a school for which the defendant was responsible. She 
had also been exposed to low level asbestos in the general atmosphere. The judge at first 
instance held that the defendant had been in breach of its duty in relation to its exposure of 
the claimant to asbestos and that the exposure, although small, was not minimal. Therefore, 
the exposure had materially increased the risk of her contracting mesothelioma. The Court 
of Appeal had dismissed an appeal by the defendant. The defendants appealed in each of 
these cases to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court confirmed the application of the Fairchild exception to mesothelioma 
cases even where one of the sources of asbestos was the environment rather than multiple 
tortious exposure (as in Fairchild) or self-exposure (as in Barker). So the Fairchild exception 
had been extended further still. There was to be no difference in treatment between 
what some term as single exposure cases and cases where there are multiple defendants. 
This extension, however, was a development within the confines of mesothelioma 
cases. As an aside, the meaning of Section 3 of the Compensation Act 2006 was clarified 
after the misreading by the Court of Appeal. Section 3 did not provide that in cases of 
mesothelioma the defendant will be held liable in tort if he has materially increased the 
risk of a victim contracting mesothelioma. It provides that where a defendant is held 
liable in a mesothelioma case, they will be liable for the whole of the damage caused, 
jointly and severally, whether that liability is established because the defendant materially 
increased the risk of the victim contracting mesothelioma or for any other reason. It is still 
the common law alone that dictates when causation is established.   
Perhaps because Parliament intervened in this area in the form of Section 3 of the 
Compensation Act 2006, there is a feeling of restraint in the discussion of causation in the 
judgments in this case. Barker redefined the decision in Fairchild to justify joint liability 
rather than joint and several liability. Parliament reinstated joint and several liability. The 
injustice which in Fairchild the House of Lords had fairly unanimously agreed would lay 
heavy on the claimants if liability was not established, is in Sienkiewicz no longer so clearly 
46 Novartis Grimsby Ltd v Cookson [2007] EWCA Civ 1261.
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pointing in favour of the claimants. The result of Parliament’s intervention meant that 
in a future case that was factually similar to Barker, the defendants would be jointly and 
severally liable for a disease which may in fact have been caused by asbestos exposure to 
which the claimant had exposed himself. The Court had rejected this in Barker. The Court 
was faced in Sienkiewicz with a factual situation where the defendant would be held fully 
liable where in fact the exposure to asbestos dust which caused the disease may have 
been environmental exposure. All the Justices in Sienkiewicz agreed that the extension of 
the Fairchild exception to this type of mesothelioma case could not be avoided,47 but the 
Justices could see that the injustice was starting to severely affect the defendants. Their 
obiter remarks on the requirements for the establishing of causation in other types of cases 
show the majority of the Court returning to traditional causal requirements. 
In Sienkiewicz a number of the Court reacted to this increasingly obvious injustice to 
defendants by emphasising that the Fairchild exception applied only to mesothelioma 
cases and that the traditional tests of causation were still to apply in any other type of 
case.48 Lord Brown, the most outspoken in this respect, was quite critical of how the law 
has developed since McGhee. He said:
Although, therefore, mesothelioma claims must now be considered from the 
defendant’s standpoint a lost cause, there is to my mind a lesson to be learned from 
losing it: the law tampers with the “but for” test of causation at its peril.49
He seemed to be in favour of returning to the traditional “but for” test in anything other 
than mesothelioma cases, where the die “was inexorably cast in Fairchild”.50 Lord Brown 
felt constrained to find liability in the cases before him because of the development of the 
law in Fairchild, Barker and then Section 3 of the Compensation Act 2006. He questioned 
whether this special treatment of mesothelioma cases was actually justified and suggested 
that the judges in Fairchild could not have known the law would have developed as it had. 
He felt that: “It is to my mind quite clear that the preparedness of the majority of the court 
in Barker to extend the reach of the Fairchild principle this far was specifically dependent 
upon there being aliquot liability only”.51 Lord Brown said in the final paragraph of his 
judgment: “Save only for mesothelioma cases, claimants should henceforth expect little 
flexibility from the courts in their approach to causation”.52 Lord Brown felt that this area 
of law benefited from clarity, consistency, and certainty, and that special rules have no 
place in the principles for compensation for personal injury. 
 
Lady Hale also seemed to suggest that although she accepted that the Fairchild exception 
applied to these single tortious exposure cases, the decision of Fairchild was a mistake and 
their Lordships could not have foreseen the far-reaching implications. She accepted that 
there is no point in reversing the decision in Fairchild because Parliament would reverse 
47 Lord Phillips saw this as a straightforward application of Barker v Corus - see Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd and 
Willmore v Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council [2011] UKSC 10; [2011] 2 WLR 523 per Lord Phillips at para. 70. 
See also in particular, Lord Rodger at para. 160; Lady Hale at para. 173; Lord Brown at para. 184; Lord Mance 
at paras. 188-189; Lord Kerr at para. 203; and Lord Dyson at para. 212.
48 See in particular Sienkiewicz per Lady Hale at para. 167, Lord Mance at para. 189, and Lord Brown at para. 
187.
49 Sienkiewicz  per Lord Brown at para. 186.
50 Sienkiewicz per Lord Brown at para. 185.
51 Sienkiewicz per Lord Brown at para. 182 .
52 Sienkiewicz per Lord Brown at para. 187.
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that decision of the Supreme Court’s (presumably based on the fact that Parliament 
reversed the joint liability finding in Barker), but there was little doubt that as far as Lady 
Hale is concerned, the Fairchild exception will not be applied beyond mesothelioma cases.
Lord Mance, although he agreed that Fairchild and Barker apply on the facts and he 
agreed with the reasoning of Lord Phillips, Rodger, Dyson and Lady Hale on this aspect, 
also agreed with Lady Hale and Lord Brown on the impossibility of going back on 
Fairchild, and “the lesson of caution”53 that this teaches on future invitations to depart from 
conventional principles of causation, suggesting strongly his disinclination to welcome 
such future invitations. 
Referring to Fairchild and Barker, Lord Phillips said that:
Those cases developed the common law by equating “materially increasing the 
risk” with “contributing to the cause” in specified and limited circumstances, which 
include ignorance of how causation in fact occurs. The common law is capable of 
further development.54
This was said, however, within the context of Section 3 of the Compensation Act 
2006 which deals with mesothelioma. Lord Phillips went on to elaborate;  section 3 did 
not preclude the courts from reverting to the conventional balance of probabilities in 
mesothelioma cases should advances in medical science in such cases make clearer the 
way in which mesothelioma is caused. It would appear that this development of the 
common law that he has in mind is only within the context of mesothelioma cases, and 
if anything would be a reversion to more traditional principles if scientific knowledge 
allowed. Even Lord Rodger, the only Justice in Seinkiewicz that also sat in Fairchild and 
Barker, kept the increased risk test restricted to mesothelioma cases and made no reference 
to the applicability of such a test beyond such cases. Lord Kerr and Lord Dyson gave no 
hint of their own opinion on the Fairchild exception. They accepted that it applied to the 
cases before them but went no further than that. 
All the Justices, except Lord Brown, in their discussion of causal requirements bring 
up the nature of epidemiological evidence and its place in establishing causation. They all 
warn against placing excessive reliance on such evidence in determining that on a balance 
of probability the defendant caused the injury or disease. Their reasoning differs, but their 
ultimate opinions on its value are very close. This may be considered along with other 
factors, and its limitations need to be recognised. Lord Phillips described the particular 
problems with epidemiological evidence in relation to mesothelioma cases.55 Lord Rodger 
pointed out that as a result of the nature of epidemiological evidence, the most that this 
evidence can do is establish that on the balance of probability the defendant probably 
caused the damage. This he recognised, is not the law of causation in either England 
or Scotland.  Lady Hale pointed out: “But if the disease materialises, the existence of a 
statistically significant association between factor X and disease Y does not prove that in 
the individual case it is more likely than not that factor X caused disease Y”.56 Lord Mance 
felt that it should be considered along with specific evidence related to the individual 
circumstances and parties; what significance a court may attach to this will depend on 
53 Sienkiweicz per Lord Mance at para. 189.
54 Sienkiewicz per Lord Phillips at para. 70.
55 See in particular Lord Phillips’ judgment at paras. 80-84 and 98-102.
56 Sienkiewicz per Lady Hale at para. 170.
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the nature of the epidemiological evidence and the particular factual issues before the 
court. It would be rare that epidemiological evidence by itself would prove a case. A 
similar opinion was shared by Lord Kerr. Lord Dyson was probably the most generous to 
epidemiological evidence when he said:
It seems to me, however, that there is no a priori reason why, if the epidemiological 
evidence is cogent enough, it should not be sufficient to enable a claimant to prove 
his case without more. Our civil law does not deal in scientific or logical certainties.57
Some of the Justices dealt with the doubling the risk test, which was applied in the Court 
of Appeal case of Novartis Grimsby. But there is a difference of opinion on its value. Such a 
test applies epidemiological data to establishing causation on the balance of probabilities 
where science does not allow the exact cause of a disease or injury to be known. The 
argument is that if statistical evidence suggests that the wrongdoer’s wrongdoing more 
than doubled the risk that the victim would suffer the injury, then it follows that it is more 
probable than not that the wrongdoer caused the injury.
 Lady Hale and Lord Rodger are both opposed to using the doubling the risk test to 
establish causation in any type of case. Lord Brown did not specifically refer to the doubling 
the risk test but one would suppose that he would oppose such a test because his judgment 
is strongly in favour of the traditional “but for” test without exception. Lords Mance, Kerr, 
and Dyson did not mention the test explicitly, but they did all warn against over reliance 
on epidemiological evidence. Lords Mance and Kerr at least, on the basis of what they said 
about epidemiological evidence generally, would not appear to favour the doubling of the 
risk test in all cases where it was impossible to say what caused the damage. Lord Phillips 
is most favourable towards the doubling the risk test. He is willing to see its value in some 
types of multiple cause cases involving diseases other than mesothelioma. Although still 
adhering to the Bonnington Castings rule for cases where two agents operate cumulatively 
and simultaneously in causing the onset of the disease, one situation where the doubles 
the risk test may be appropriate, in his opinion, is where the initiation of the disease is 
dose-related and there have been consecutive exposures to an agent or agents that cause 
the disease, one innocent and one tortious, particularly where the innocent exposure 
came first. Another situation is where there are competing alternative potential causes of 
a disease or injury, such as in the case of Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority.58 So 
long as the court is “astute to see that the epidemiological evidence provides a really sound 
basis for determining the statistical probability of the cause or causes of the disease”,59 he 
can see no reason in principle why the test should not be applied. Lord Phillips quoted 
Smith LJ in Novartis Grimsby Ltd where she justifies her opinion that the doubles the risk 
test satisfies the “but for” test. She said: “In terms of risk, if occupational exposure more 
than doubles the risk due to smoking, it must, as a matter of logic, be probable that the 
disease was caused by the former”.60 Lord Phillips agreed with Smith LJ as a matter of 
logic, but, as he himself pointed out, these are statistical probabilities. They are usually 
based on epidemiological evidence. It is assuming that the claimant is not atypical. It is 
establishing on a balance of probability that the wrongdoing probably caused the disease. 
57 Sienkiewicz per Lord Dyson at para. 222.
58 Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [ 1987] AC 750. 
59 Sienkiewicz  per Lord Phillips at para. 91.
60 Sienkiewicz per Lord Phillips at para. 77.
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But that does not mean that in the given case, the wrongdoing had actually caused the 
disease or even that on the balance of probability the wrongdoing had caused the disease.
The doubles the risk test is more demanding than the material increase in risk test. The 
material increase in risk creates a lower threshold because the risk only has to be more 
than de minimis. The doubles the risk test requires the risk to be twice as much as the risk 
from the alternative source. But both tests are ultimately merely dealing with risk rather 
than occurrence.61 Lord Phillips therefore is the only Justice in Sienkiewicz who appeared 
to be willing to accommodate a relaxation in causal requirements beyond mesothelioma 
cases. It is arguable however that using epidemiological evidence alone to establish that 
on a balance of probability the wrongdoing caused the disease is itself effectively allowing 
a relaxation in causal requirements through the back door. The other Justices do warn 
against over reliance on epidemiological evidence. In reality it is difficult to actually 
control any particular judge’s reliance on and use of such evidence.  
We can see a significant change in attitude in the Supreme Court from Fairchild to 
Sienkiewicz. The relaxed, quite radical handling of causation in Fairchild, with the significant 
role that risk plays in establishing causation, has been replaced with a mainly conservative 
approach; a reluctant application of the Fairchild exception to only mesothelioma cases, 
and a clear message from the majority that a strict application of the “but for” test will 
apply in all other cases. But despite the Justices’ views that they were bound to apply the 
Fairchild exception to the Sienkiewicz cases, it is arguable that they were not so constrained. 
If the exception had been restricted to Fairchild type cases, where all the sources of the 
one substance were wrongful, and McGhee type cases, where the one substance came 
from more than one source but for which the same wrongful defender was responsible, 
then the global “but for” justification that Chief Justice McLachlin relied on in the case 
of Clements (Litigation Guardian of) v Clements62 could have been applied.63 There is an 
argument that the case of Barker, which allowed the risk exception to apply where there 
was asbestos exposure by virtue of the environment, was overruled by the Compensation 
Act 2006. Sienkiewicz did not have to be decided as it was. The risk exception, so restricted, 
could have been used beyond mesothelioma cases for other single agent cases where it is 
scientifically impossible to determine the precise cause and the only source of that agent 
is either a number of possible wrongful defendants or a number of sources under the 
control of one wrongful defendant. The decision to allow increased risk to inform the 
establishment of causation in this type of situation may not have been so heavily criticised, 
and an argument for its use in the future could have remained intact.
In Sienkiewicz there is a clear warning against the dangers of over reliance on 
epidemiological statistics where risk plays a significant role. It can be considered along 
with other factors, and its limitations need to be recognised. Lord Phillips stands out as the 
most open to the doubles the risk test in future multiple cause cases where the cause of the 
disease or injury cannot be established to the satisfaction of the “but for” test.  And that is 
as radical as Sienkiewicz gets beyond mesothelioma cases. The pivotal role of increased risk 
61 See Lord Rodger’s judgment in Sienkiewicz and also the discussion in Sandy Steel and David Ibbetson, 
“More Grief on Uncertain Causation in Tort”, Cambridge Law Journal, LXX (2011), p. 451.
62 Clements (Litigation Guardian of) v Clements 2012 SCC 32.  
63 See below at the discussion on Canada.
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in mesothelioma cases will not be extended to other types of cases, it would seem, as far as 
the majority of the Justices who sat in Sienkiewicz are concerned. 
Clarification of Basis of Fairchild Exception - Durham v BAI (Run Off) Ltd 
The role of risk in causation was the subject of discussion in the Supreme Court in the 
case of Durham v BAI (Run Off) Ltd.64 In this case a number of insurance companies 
questioned whether their employer liability insurance policies covered employers for 
cases of mesothelioma which did not manifest in the employee until after the insurance 
period. The various insurance policies covered injury or disease that was “sustained”, or 
“contracted”, or “sustained or contracted” by employees in the course of their employment. 
This raised the issue of causation in mesothelioma cases once more in the Supreme Court. 
The distinction between imposition of liability for the creation of the risk of contracting 
mesothelioma (the Barker interpretation) and imposition of liability for contributing to 
the contraction of mesothelioma by virtue of the employers materially increasing the risk 
of mesothelioma (Lord Rodger’s interpretation of Fairchild in Barker) which first arose in 
Barker came up again in this decision, due primarily to the dissenting opinion of Lord 
Phillips. 
Lord Phillips took the opportunity to admit that his interpretation of Fairchild and 
Barker in the Sienkiewicz case, whereby materially increasing the risk was equated with 
contributing to the cause, was not an accurate summary of what he referred to as the special 
approach adopted in those cases.65 He decided to adhere to the majority interpretation in 
Barker where liability is for the creation of the risk. He seems to have been swayed by part 
of Lord Hoffmann’s extra-judicial explanation in Perspectives on Causation66 and did not feel 
that the Compensation Act 2006 altered the jurisprudential basis of the special approach, 
just the effect of that special approach, despite the fact that Lord Hoffmann himself did 
see the 2006 Act as altering the basis of the special approach, and thereby instituting Lord 
Rodger’s dissenting opinion in Barker, as is pointed out by Lord Mance in Durham. 67 
The majority in Durham put an end to this interpretation of Fairchild by re-explaining 
Fairchild and Barker. According to the majority in Durham,68 Fairchild and Barker are to be 
interpreted as establishing liability not for the creation of the risk, but for the contracting 
of mesothelioma. In the special factual circumstances of mesothelioma, the wrongdoer’s 
material increase of the risk of contracting the disease meets the causal requirements, and 
this is a relaxation of the traditional causal requirement which the Supreme Court has 
allowed in these particular circumstances. Lord Mance referred to a “weak” or “broad” 
causal link.69 
The retraction and conservatism in Sienkiewicz was reflected in the judgments and in the 
attitude of the majority in Durham. The Justices proceeded on the basis that the restriction 
of risk in establishing causation in mesothelioma cases had been established in Sienkiewicz. 
Lord Phillips referred in Durham to the criticism to which the Fairchild special approach has 
64 Durham v BAI (Run Off) Ltd [2012] UKSC 14, [2012] 1 WLR 867.
65 Durham per Lord Phillips at para. 117. 
66 See Lord Hoffmann in Goldberg, note 1 above, p. 8.
67 Durham per Lord Mance at para 62. See Lord Hoffmann in Goldberg, note 1 above, p. 8
68 Lord Mance gave the leading judgment with Lords Dyson, Kerr, and Clark agreeing with Lord Mance. 
69 Durham per Lord Mance at paras. 73 and 74. 
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been subjected, both judicial and academic.70 It seems that he had become aware of a strong 
objection to this level of judicial law making, for he sought to justify the special approach 
in Fairchild and Barker; reminding us that the reason the Supreme Court originally took this 
approach was to achieve justice. But he seemed to apprehend a dissension and felt that to 
apply the majority interpretation so that in Durham, the mesothelioma is held to have been 
sustained when it was caused and any and all exposures that are independently sufficient 
are taken to have caused the mesothelioma by virtue of the Fairchild principle, and so 
insurers are held liable where otherwise they would not, may be taking things too far. The 
majority in Durham seemed to have decided to bring this line of reasoning to its logical 
conclusion in relation to the position with the insurers, but because the special rule had 
been limited to mesothelioma cases, they seemed confident in this one final consequence. 
The Justices in Durham decided to follow Lord Hoffmann’s approach, first begun 
in Fairchild, of recognising an increase in risk as a transparent relaxation in the rules of 
causation but specifically only in mesothelioma cases. They followed the Lord Hoffmann 
interpretation of Fairchild in Barker. However, despite the caution in Sienkiewicz and Durham, 
and the restriction to mesothelioma cases, the cases of McGhee and Fairchild left open the 
possibility of a material increase in risk  informing the consideration of causation in other 
types of cases in the future if it were scientifically impossible to say how the disease or 
injury was caused and justice in the eyes of the Court demanded such an approach. This 
is because everything else that was stated in Sienkiewicz beyond the application of the 
Fairchild exception to the cases before the Court, and the rejection of the doubles the risk 
test to such cases, was obiter. 
In the same way, the Supreme Court in Durham was dealing with the interpretation of 
the special rule in mesothelioma cases. Discussions beyond that were obiter. Admittedly, 
the chances are that we will not be seeing the Fairchild exception being applied by the 
Supreme Court in anything other than mesothelioma cases in the near future, nor a material 
increase in risk becoming predominant in the consideration of causation. Both the McGhee 
and Fairchild exceptions are there, nevertheless, if they are needed in the future; and for a 
differently constituted Supreme Court. Just as the doubling the risk test is available as an 
alternative to bare “but for” causation.71 McGhee and Fairchild remain significant because 
they laid the foundation for a departure from the traditional tests of causation where 
justice so demands. For now, however, the traditional and safe route to causation will be 
the one favoured until a strong argument to depart from it can be made out. The clarity, 
consistency, and certainty that Lord Brown advocated can never be guaranteed whilst 
McGhee and Fairchild remain good law. They leave the door of causation open. McGhee and 
Fairchild have together created a potential for greater flexibility in establishing causation. 
This is a significant development; a justice-led pragmatic recognition that in both England 
and Scotland a strict application of traditional approaches to causation cannot adequately 
deal with the diseases that cause personal injury.
 If this potential is developed in future cases, one option is to pursue Lord Hutton’s 
explanation of McGhee in Fairchild and the drawing of a factual inference in a particular case. 
70 Durham per Lord Phillips at para. 135. 
71 And has been embraced by subsequent lower English courts. Though it has been taken to satisfy the “but 
for” test - see below. 
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This may achieve justice in the particular case before the court. Brown argued in its favour.72 
This would allow an increase in risk by the wrongdoer, along with other evidence in a 
particular case, to influence the establishment in that particular case, of causation, without 
departing from the traditional rules of the “but for” test and the material contribution test. 
It would be consistent with the demands of formal justice and yet could be consistent, 
on its face, with the accepted traditional rules of causation. The Canadian and Australian 
courts have taken this route. There are signs in the lower courts in the United Kingdom 
that relaxation in the rules on causation is better approached through the traditional rules. 
Despite the warnings of the Supreme Court, lower English courts have in fact embraced 
the doubles the risk test for non-mesothelioma occupational cancer cases where it is 
impossible to say scientifically that the cancer was caused by a particular carcinogenic 
substance from a particular source.73 But rather than being openly acknowledged as a 
relaxation of the causal requirements, it is being taken as establishing the “but for” test.74 
This gives it acceptability in the new conservative causation environment,75 and would 
appear to be taken from the Canadian and Australian law books.   
The recent evolution of the rules on causation in the United Kingdom has regrettably 
left them in a state unable to meet the needs of personal injury. The tort system needs to 
remain meaningful.76 The Supreme Court retraction in Sienkiewicz and Durham and return 
to the safety of the strict application of the “but for” rule, having created one exception 
in the course of its uncertain journey, has, in a sense, been a missed opportunity. If the 
Supreme Court was going to decide Fairchild in the way it did, it should have continued 
confidently on its journey; realised that the rules of causation required an overall review77, 
and instigated a confident reassessment of the “but for” and material contribution 
rules, at the very least resulting in a more flexible application of these rules, which in 
appropriate circumstances and in conjunction with other factors, allows risk to play some 
role in establishing causation through the drawing of a factual inference. McGhee had laid 
the foundations for such an approach. Lord Bridge in the case of Wilsher built on those 
foundations. Such a flexible application of the “but for” rule can be seen in Canada. 
CANADA
In Canada, as in England and Scotland, the fundamental principles of causation are that the 
plaintiff must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that “but for” the defendant’s negligence, 
72 Russell Brown, “Inferring Cause in Fact and the Search for Legal Truth,” in Goldberg, note 1 above. 
73 Before Sienkiewicz, see, for example, Shortell v BICAL Construction 16 May 2008, unreported; and in the Court 
of Appeal, Novartis Grimsby v Cookson  [2007] EWCA Civ 1261. Following Sienkiewicz,  see Jones v Secretary of State 
for Energy and Climate Change [2012] EWHC 2936 (QB). See also Robert O’Leary, note 9 above, p. 19. 
74 See Novartis Grimsby v Cookson [2007] EWCA Civ 1261 and Jones v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change [2012] EWHC 2936 (QB).
75 But the doubles the risk test is not a failsafe approach either. It has its detractors. See Jane Stapleton, “Factual 
Causation, Mesothelioma and Statistical Validity”, Law Quarterly Review, CXXVIII (2012), p. 221; and Steel and 
Ibbetson, note 61 above, p. 451 – who say that obiter, the weight of the Supreme Court is against the doubles the 
risk test alone, to establish causation. 
76 Justice Beverley McLachlin in “Negligence Law - Proving the Connection”, in Mullany and Linden Torts 
Tomorrow, A Tribute to John.Fleming (1998), p. 35.
77 Jane Stapleton makes some recommendations. See Jane Stapleton, “Unneccessary Causes”, Law Quarterly 
Review, CXXIX (2013), p. 129.
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the plaintiff would not have suffered the loss.78 It has been the position in Canada that the 
defendant’s negligence need not be the only causal factor, but that causation is satisfied if 
the negligence made a material contribution to the harm.79 In the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Athey v Leonati80 Major J stated,
It is not now necessary, nor has it ever been, for the plaintiff to establish that the 
defendant’s negligence was the sole cause of the injury … As long as a defendant is 
part of the cause of an injury, the defendant is liable, even though his act alone was 
not enough to create the injury.81
A contributing factor will be material if it falls outside the de minimis range.82 However, 
there has been a willingness on the part of the Canadian courts to be flexible with regard 
to the rules of causation. This can be seen in the case of Cook v Lewis.83 Two persons fired 
shots in the same direction. The plaintiff was injured by one of the shots, but it could not 
be proved on a balance of probabilities which shot actually injured the plaintiff. The case 
of Cook v Lewis has been taken to be the leading authority for the proposition that, when 
justified by circumstances, the Supreme Court of Canada will reverse the burden of proof 
in order to establish causation in a negligence action.84 Rand J’s judgment does reveal that 
he is in favour of a shifting of the onus of proof to the wrongdoers in a situation where 
the plaintiff is not only injured by one of the negligent acts but is also prevented, by virtue 
of the nature of the acts, from being able to establish causation and thereby liability. The 
judgement of the majority (as delivered by Cartwright J), on the other hand, does not as 
clearly advocate a reversal of the burden of proof in such a situation, although that is the 
practical effect of their judgment. They state that the general rule in criminal law is that if 
it is certain that one of two individuals committed an offence but it is uncertain which did 
it, then neither can be convicted.85 This is applicable in civil actions, so that the action must 
fail unless there are special circumstances which make the rule inapplicable. The majority 
then go on to follow the United States case of Summers v Tice.86 It is not clear whether they 
accept the aspect of Summers v Tice that the burden of proof should shift to the defendants 
in these type of circumstances, for Cartwright J states, “I do not think it necessary to decide 
whether all that was said in Summers v Tice should be accepted as stating the law of British 
Columbia, but ...”.87
The majority stress that if it is decided that the plaintiff was shot by either one or other 
of the defendants, but it is not possible to say which it was because both shot negligently in 
78 Horsley v McLaren [1972] SCR 441.
79 Myers v Peel County Board of Education [1981] 2 SCR 21; School Division of Assiniboine South No 3 and Hoffer v 
Greater Winnipeg Gas Co. [1971] 4 WWR 746 (Man CA), aff’d [1973] SCR vi.   
80 Athey v Leonati [1997] 1 WWR 97.
81 Athey v Leonati [1997] 1 WWR 97, per Major J at para. 17.
82 R v Pinske (1988) 30 BCLR (2d) 114 (CA), aff’d [1989] 2 SCR 979. See also Athey v Leonati [1997] 1 WWR 97.
83 Cook v Lewis [1951] SCR 830.
84 See Mitchell McInnes “Causation in Tort Law: A Decade in the Supreme Court of Canada”, Saskatchewan 
Law Review, XXXV (2000), p. 445. Justice Beverley McLachlin, “Negligence Law - Proving the Connection”. in 
Mullany and Linden, note 76 above, simply referred to Cook v Lewis as an alternative approach to the “but for” 
test.
85 Cook per Cartwright J at para. 35 (relying on Starkie on Evidence (4th ed.), p. 860 and approved by Patterson 
J.A. in Moxley v The Canada Atlantic Railway Company (1887) 14 OAR 309 at 315).
86 Summers v Tice (1948) 5 ALR (2nd) 91.
87 Cook per Cartwright J at para 44.
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the plaintiff’s direction, then both defendants should be found liable. The majority appear 
to be guided in their decision by fairness and justice. 
Although it is by no means clear that the majority in Cook v Lewis opted for a reversal 
of the burden of proof after the decision by the House of Lords in the case of McGhee, 
and although it was really only Lord Wilberforce who in that case espoused a reversal of 
the burden of proof where the plaintiff had evidential difficulties, the Canadian courts 
embraced this reversal of the burden of proof and went on to apply it in subsequent 
cases.88 When Wilsher, decided by the House of Lords, rejected the idea that McGhee had 
laid down a new principle of law that the burden of proof should be reversed in certain 
circumstances, the Canadian courts drew an inference of causation.89 Sopinka J, who gave 
the judgment of the Supreme Court in Snell v Farrell,90 himself, made clear that there is to 
be no overt reversal of the burden of proof in establishing causation.
In Snell, the plaintiff, Mrs. Snell, was a 70 year old lady who had a cataract. The 
defendant, Dr. Farrell, an ophthalmologist, carried out an operation on Mrs. Snell’s eye 
to remove the cataract. Mrs. Snell’s optic nerve in her right eye atrophied, which resulted 
in the loss of sight in her right eye. Neither of the medical experts called to give evidence 
were able to say with certainty what caused the atrophy or when it occurred. One possible 
cause was pressure due to retrobulbar haemorrhage. Mrs. Snell had suffered a retrobulbar 
bleed at the start of the operation but Dr. Farrell continued with the operation. Another 
cause is a stroke in the eye which is most likely in a patient with cardiovascular disease, 
high blood pressure, or diabetes. Mrs. Snell suffered from the last two. Mrs. Snell also 
suffered from severe glaucoma which over a long period, can also cause nerve atrophy. So 
there were a number of possible causes of the nerve atrophy, one of which was the actions 
of Dr. Farrell whilst the others were “innocent” causes. The case was therefore similar to 
Wilsher.
Sopinka J in Snell made a thorough analysis of the recent developments in the 
requirements to establish causation. He began by referring to the traditional principles 
in the law of torts as the “but for” test. He noted that this traditional “but for” test of 
causation has not always been applied, particularly where there is more than one negligent 
defendant but the plaintiff cannot produce evidence to prove causation against any 
specific defendant in accordance with traditional principles and that in such cases there 
has sometimes been a shifting in the onus of proof and in this regard refers to the case of 
Cook v Lewis and the pre-Wilsher view that was taken of McGhee.
Sopinka J looked at the case of McGhee in some detail. He stated that two theories 
of causation emerge from McGhee – (1) the plaintiff need prove only that the defendant 
created a risk of harm and the injury occurred within the area of that risk (the reversal of 
the onus of proof a part of that); and (2) in the circumstances, an inference of causation 
can be drawn because there is no practical difference between materially contributing to 
88 See for example Wipfli v Britten (1984) 13 DLR (4th) 169 (BC CA); Powell v Guttman (No2) (1978) 89 DLR (3d) 
180 (Man CA); Letnik v Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) (1988) 49 DLR (4th) 707 (FCA), taken from McInnes, 
note 84 above, p. 445, fn. 8.
89 See Sopinka J in Snell v Farrell 4 CCLT (2d) 229 at para. 25. He refers to the following cases as drawing an 
inference - see Rendall v. Ewert (1989), 38 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1 (C.A.); Kitchen v. McMullen (1989), 100 N.B.R. (2d) 91 (C.A.); 
Westco Storage Ltd. v. Inter-City Gas Utilities Ltd., [1989] 4 W.W.R. 289 (Man. C.A.); and Haag v. Marshall, [1990] 1 
W.W.R. 361 (B.C.C.A.).
90 Snell v Farrell 4 CCLT (2d) 229.
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the risk of harm and materially contributing to the harm itself. He noted that Canadian 
cases decided after McGhee but before Wilsher tended to follow McGhee by adopting either 
theory. Even when it was the inference theory that a court opted for, the creation of the risk 
was deemed to establish a prima facie case which then shifted the onus on to the defendant. 
But Canadian cases after Wilsher accepted its interpretation of McGhee, and they then drew 
an inference to find causation.91
In questioning whether there is a need to look further than the traditional approach to 
causation, Sopinka J here took the traditional approach as being that the tortious conduct 
must cause the harm or contribute to the plaintiff’s harm. His discussion of McGhee showed 
that he drew a distinction between the traditional test of causation as aforementioned and 
the alternative approach of drawing an inference of causation where all that could be 
proved was that the defendant had increased the risk of harm, and in the circumstances it 
was felt that there was no practical difference between materially contributing to the risk 
of harm and materially contributing to the harm itself.92 Sopinka J did not discuss in detail 
what exactly the traditional causal requirements are. He obviously did not think there 
was any question over the meaning of causing the harm or materially contributing to the 
harm itself. This lack of a clear pronouncement on the meaning of materially contributing 
caused great problems for Canadian courts in the years to follow.  
Sopinka J felt that the traditional causal requirements were quite sufficient for the type 
of case that is before him, that is, where there are a number of different possible causes, 
some of which are unconnected to the defendant and not the fault of anyone and are 
therefore “innocent”. They ensure that there is a substantial connection between the injury 
and the defendant’s conduct. He accepted the reversal of the burden of proof in a Cook 
v Lewis type situation, where both suspected causes were negligent. He rejected the two 
alternative approaches:93 the two theories of causation that emerge from McGhee, for a 
Wilsher type case, as the case before him was.  He believed that if these were adopted, 
the result would be that a plaintiff would receive compensation where there was no 
substantial connection between the injury and the defendant’s negligence. So he rejected 
the increase in risk causation test for Wilsher type cases. It is not clear if he rejected such 
a test in a McGhee type case; that is, where all possible sources of the harm stem from the 
defendant and involve the same agent, or a Fairchild type case, where all possible sources 
of harm are the result of negligence of a number of defendants and all involve the same 
agent, or a Barker/Sienkiewicz type case, where the sources are a result of a mix of tortious 
conduct and non-tortious factors but still involve the same agent.  
The Court judgment up to this point is clear, but Sopinka J then stated that the 
dissatisfaction with the traditional approach to causation stems from its too rigid 
application and thereby advocated a less rigid application of the traditional approach. 
He stated that causation need not be determined by scientific precision. What is required 
legally is not 100% certainty but simply “more probably so”; that is, 51%. This is quite 
so. However, Sopinka J then went on to accept something similar to the drawing of an 
inference where there is an increase in risk. He did this in the case before him, and thereby 
91 Sopinka J did not distinguish between a legal inference and a factual inference, although Wilsher took the 
view that McGhee drew a factual inference. Sopinka J cited a number of cases as examples – see para. 25 of his 
judgment.
92 See in particular paras. 22 and 27, Sopinka J judgment.
93 As he sees them in para. 22. 
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accepted this looser causal test even in Wilsher type cases. He effectively did this because 
he went on to state that there is not so much a shifting of the evidential burden of proof, 
but the plaintiff may lead evidence which results in an adverse inference being drawn 
against the defendant, if the defendant cannot lead evidence to the contrary, even where 
positive or scientific proof of causation has not been adduced. Sopinka J felt that if these 
points are remembered and applied with the traditional causal requirements, they are 
sufficient to deal with most situations.
Sopinka J seemed to distinguish between two types of inference. There is an inference 
of causation drawn from the evidence led by the plaintiff, although positive or scientific 
proof of causation has not been adduced, and there is an absence of evidence to the contrary 
being led by the defendant; and then there is the inference that has been drawn by judges 
where there has been an increase in the risk of harm to the plaintiff and an injury occurred 
within the area of that risk. The former is acceptable to Sopinka J and the Supreme Court 
of Canada even in Wilsher type cases. The latter the Court felt did not create a sufficient 
connection between the injury and the defendant such as to justify a finding of causation, 
at least in a Wilsher type case where there are some “innocent” causes. But is there a great 
difference between the two?
In Snell it was established that in the type of case Snell is, where there are other possible 
causes which are innocent and the defendant has nothing to do with, the traditional test 
of causation is adequate. But the traditional test of causation should not be applied too 
strictly. A positive opinion from a doctor is not necessary. It may be possible to draw 
an inference from the circumstances that the negligent conduct of the defendant caused 
the injury in the absence of evidence to the contrary being led by the defendant. And 
this would simply be the application of common sense. However, this could effectively 
amount to the same as an increase in risk creating an inference of causation because in the 
circumstances there was no practical difference between materially contributing to the risk 
of harm and materially contributing to the harm itself. This can be seen by the fact that 
Sopinka J admitted that the finding of causation in the case before the Court could be on 
either basis:
The finding in the last paragraph can be read as a finding of causation inferred from 
the circumstances and in the absence of evidence to the contrary in satisfaction 
of the evidential burden cast upon the defendant. Or it could be interpreted as 
accepting Lord Wilberforce’s formulation in McGhee which reverses the ultimate 
burden upon finding that a risk was created and an injury occurred within the area 
of risk. If the former was intended, I am of the opinion that such an inference was 
fully warranted on the evidence. On the other hand, if the latter is the interpretation 
to be placed on that statement, and I am inclined to think that it is, then I am 
satisfied that had the trial Judge applied the principles referred to above he would 
have drawn an inference of causation between the appellant’s negligence and the 
injury to the respondent.94 
Sopinka J is advocating the drawing of a factual inference in these types of cases as 
opposed to the drawing of a legal inference. Why does the Court assert the application 
of traditional principles of causation but then advocate an application of those traditional 
94 Snell per Sopinka J at  para. 43.
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principles that effectively reduces the requirement to establish causation to the same level 
as McGhee, and do so even in Wilsher type cases? One possible reason is that the Court 
wanted to retain the structure of the traditional rules of causation and avoid the evidential 
difficulties in some cases by saying that those traditional rules need not be applied so strictly. 
This allowed them to find causation even where the connection between the defendant’s 
negligence and the injury is more tenuous. They allowed this even in Wilsher type cases. At 
this point, therefore, the approach taken by the Canadian Supreme Court is arguably more 
relaxed than the approach taken by the House of Lords at the equivalent time.95 At this 
point, the House of Lords had decided McGhee and Wilsher but not yet Fairchild. Wilsher 
had interpreted the decision in McGhee as the drawing of a factual inference of causation 
based on the facts of that particular case; a one-off decision, laying down no new principle 
on the test of causation. But it would not draw an inference in Wilsher itself. Fairchild had 
yet to resuscitate McGhee and draw from it any relaxed test for causation.
In Snell we can see an application of traditional principles and a following of precedent. 
In the application of the traditional principles we see such a loose application that those 
traditional principles are able to embrace/encompass cases where evidential difficulties 
make it impossible to establish the exact cause of the injury. 
In the case of Athey v Leonati,96 the Supreme Court of Canada robustly and confidently 
stated that causation will be established if the negligent acts of the defendant caused or 
materially contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries. The general test is the “but for” test, but 
the court recognised that the “but for” test is “unworkable” in some circumstances. The 
Court did not, however, elaborate on what these circumstances are. The Court repeated 
what was said in Snell – the test is not to be applied rigidly; scientific precision is not 
required; it is a practical question that can be answered by common sense (quoting from 
Lord Salmon in Alphacell Ltd V Woodward);97 it is not necessary to establish that the 
defendant’s negligence was the sole cause of the injury; and although the burden of proof 
remains with the plaintiff, in some circumstances an inference of causation can be drawn 
from the evidence without positive scientific proof.98
In support of all this the Court referred to, amongst others, the cases of McGhee, Snell, 
and Bonnington Castings. As in Snell, therefore, although there is the distinct causal test of 
materially contributing to the harm (as opposed to materially increasing the risk of harm), 
by insisting on it being applied not too rigidly, the Court blurred the line between the tests 
of causing or materially  contributing to the harm, both of which ensure that there is a 
strong connection between the defendant’s negligence and the injury; and the drawing of 
an inference of causation in the circumstances, without positive scientific proof, which can 
result in a weaker connection satisfying causation. On the facts of the case, causation was 
actually established on the basis of a material contribution to the harm. No inference was 
needed. The plaintiff in Athey was involved in two motor vehicle accidents. He had pre-
existing back problems before the accidents. The trial judge concluded that the accidents 
were a necessary ingredient to the extent of 25% in bringing about herniation. The 
Supreme Court held that a 25% contribution fell outside the de minimis range. Therefore 
95 Snell was decided in August 1990. 
96 Athey v Leonati [1997] 1 WWR 97.
97 Alphacell v Woodward  [1972] AC 824.
98 Athey per Major J at para. 16.
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the accidents materially contributed to the injury and the defendants were fully liable for 
the damages flowing from the herniation. 
In the case of Walker Estate v York Finch Hospital99 the Supreme Court held that in 
cases involving negligent blood donor screening by blood banks, the appropriate test for 
establishing causation was whether the defendant’s negligence materially contributed to 
the plaintiff’s harm. The “but for” test was inappropriate because it may be difficult or 
impossible to prove hypothetically what the donor would have done had he or she been 
properly screened (although on the facts of this case the Court felt that the “but for” test 
was actually satisfied in this case, though not required in this type of case.) There was no 
reference to a looser causal connection.
The Supreme Court case of Resurfice Corp. v Hanke100 appeared to cast doubt on even 
the fundamental principles of causation. The place in the rules of causation for a factor 
which materially contributes to the injury to be enough to satisfy causation in “normal 
cases” is called into question. The Supreme Court of Canada purported to clarify the law 
of causation in Resurface, in particular the circumstances in which material contribution 
will suffice to establish causation. Unfortunately, in no sense of the word can Resurfice be 
said to clarify any aspect of the law of causation. In one short judgment, the Chief Justice 
managed to intensify the causal confusion. This is mainly because the Supreme Court 
referred to the “but for” test and the “material contribution” test. The Court did not say 
to what the defendant materially contributes to – the harm itself or to the risk of injury. It 
appears that the Court meant materially contributing to the risk of injury when it referred 
to the “material contribution” test.
On the facts there was no need to deal with the more relaxed tests for causation in 
cases of evidential difficulty because the case before them did not fall into this category. 
The Supreme Court seized on pronouncing on this area of causation because the Court 
of Appeal had raised the causal test of the defendant’s negligence material contributing 
to the injury. The Supreme Court mistakenly took this as the Court of Appeal advocating 
the use of an inference of causation because the defendant’s act had increased the risk of 
injury. By confusing the two concepts, the Supreme Court reshaped the causation test. It 
actually formulated a wider set of circumstances where the relaxed material contribution 
to the risk of injury test will apply than the House of Lords did in Fairchild and Barker.
In Resurfice, the Plaintiff was burned by a fire caused by the plaintiff filling the gasoline 
tank of an ice-resurfacing machine with hot water instead of the water tank. The plaintiff 
claimed that the two tanks were similar and placed close together, making it easy to 
confuse the two. He brought an action against the distributor and the manufacturer for 
design defects. The trial judge found that there was no evidence that the plaintiff in fact 
had been confused by them and found it was operator error that had caused the accident. 
The Supreme Court began by emphasising that the basic test for causation remained 
the “but for” test, even where there is more than one potential cause of an injury. The Chief 
Justice referred to Snell and quoted Sopinka J where he made the point that the “but for” 
test recognised that compensation for negligent conduct should only be made “where a 
substantial connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct”101 was present. It 
99 Walker Estate v York Finch Hospital [2001] 1 SCR 647.
100 Resurfice Corp. v Hanke 2007 SCC 7.
101 Resurfice per McLachlin CJ at para 23.
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ensured that a defendant will not be held liable for the plaintiff’s injuries where they “may 
very well be due to factors unconnected to the defendant and not the fault of anyone”.102 
The Chief Justice then went on to say that the “material contribution” (to risk of injury) 
test is an exception to the “but for” test to be applied in special circumstances. Broadly 
speaking, there were to be two requirements:
1. It would be impossible for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s negligence 
caused the injury using the “but for” test. The impossibility must be due to factors 
outside the plaintiff’s control; for example, current limits of scientific knowledge;
2. The defendant breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff and thereby exposed 
the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of injury, and the plaintiff suffered that form 
of injury (so the injury fell within the ambit of the risk created by the defendant’s 
breach).
The material contribution test would be allowed, the Chief Justice said, because it 
would offend basic notions of fairness and justice to deny liability if the “but for” test 
was applied. A McGhee type case would be covered, but so too would a Wilsher type case, 
because there is no restriction in the first requirement that the various potential causes all 
stem from the defendant or that they all need be a result of negligence, or that the potential 
causes all need to involve the same agent or at least that they involve an agent acting in the 
same causative way. The Court almost completely ignored the Sopinka J approach in Snell 
of applying a less-strictly-applied-traditional-rules approach by finding an inference of 
causation.  “Material contribution” was now an exception to the traditional “but for” test, 
to be applied in special circumstances. The circumstances do not actually appear to be that 
special when the two requirements are examined. 
This reshaping of the causation rules also failed to recognise that there will be 
situations where there is more than one cause of an accident and where the defendant’s 
negligent act was not the dominant cause and thus cannot pass the “but for” test, but did 
materially contribute to the injury itself. In such a situation it is not that it is impossible 
to establish that the negligent act was the dominant cause because of some impossibility 
outside the plaintiff’s control, such as limits on scientific knowledge; but simply because 
the negligence was not the sole dominant cause, but rather, was a contributing factor. 
It can, however, be proven that on a balance of probabilities, the negligence materially 
contributed to the injury. Was the Supreme Court saying that in such cases, the plaintiff 
could not recover? Even if the Supreme Court’s “material contribution” was meant to 
also include material contribution to the injury itself, their two requirements prevented 
recovery in such a situation.
The Chief Justice gave two examples of situations where these principles would apply:
(1) where it is impossible to say which of two tortious sources caused the injury. For 
example, where two shots are carelessly fired at the victim, but it is impossible to say 
which injured him. See Cook v Lewis 
However it should be noted that the material contribution to the risk of injury test was 
not applied here. The Court followed Summers v Tice and were primarily persuaded by 
fairness and justice, and perhaps by a reversal of the burden of proof.  In any case, the test 
of material contribution to the risk of injury would not establish causation in Cook v Lewis 
102 Resurfice per McLachlin CJ at para 23.
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because the “innocent” defendant did not contribute to the injury in any way and did not 
even contribute to the risk of injury by the “guilty” defendant.
(2) where it is impossible to prove what a particular person in the causal chain would have 
done had the defendant not committed a negligent act or omission, thus breaking the “but 
for” chain of causation. 
The Supreme Court refers to Walker Estate as an example, but the court in that case 
stated that material contribution to the harm itself could be used where it was impossible 
to prove that the donor whose tainted blood infected the plaintiff would not have given 
blood if the defendant had properly warned him against donating blood. The Court did 
not say materially increasing the risk of harm was sufficient.
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court in Resurfice made no mention of McGhee, 
Fairchild, or Barker. It said that it is “neither necessary nor helpful to catalogue the various 
debates”.103 The Court “simply”104 asserted the general principles that have come from the 
cases. In an area of law that is not straightforward and where the current applicable law is 
not clear, it is unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not at least disclose the cases that 
influenced its conclusions on the applicability of the “material contribution” test, not least 
because it is not obvious that the law has applied a “material contribution” test of the kind 
the Supreme Court had in mind in any case before this one.105 
Because the trial judge found on the basis of the evidence led before him that the plaintiff 
had not been confused between the two tanks and that it was purely operator error that was 
the cause of the accident, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeal had erred in 
applying the material contribution test, meaning the material increase in the risk of injury. 
The Supreme Court said that only if it is the “but for” cause will causation be established 
in all but the special cases. They said that the Court of Appeal erred in suggesting that 
where there is more than one potential cause of injury, the material contribution test must 
be used, and then in applying the material contribution test. However, they confused the 
meaning of material contribution. The Court of Appeal took material contribution from 
Athey and the meaning to be material contribution to the injury itself. The Court of Appeal 
meant that where there was in fact (and it can be proved on a balance of probabilities) 
more than one cause of the injury, one of which is the negligence and the other or others 
are innocent, using the material contribution to harm test, establishes causation. There can 
in fact be more than one cause of the harm and that can be proven to the civil standard; and 
in that case, material contribution to the harm itself is the correct test.
In Resurfice, the Supreme Court moved from the traditional “but for” test to the opposite 
extreme, to material increase in risk satisfying causation in fairly broad circumstances. 
There was no recognition of causation being satisfied by the defendant’s negligence being 
a material contributing factor to the injury, out of a number of causes; a causal connection 
which sits in between the two extremes. The case of Marszalek Estate v Bishop,106 a decision 
by the British Columbia Supreme Court after Resurfice, is an example of the confusion 
that was created by the decision in Resurfice. The British Columbia Supreme Court took 
the meaning of material contribution from Athey, that is, to mean material contribution to 
103 Resurfice per McLachlin CJ at para. 20.
104 Ibid.
105 See Resurfice per McLachlin CJ at para. 24 of the judgment.
106 Marszalek Estate v Bishop [2007] BCJ No. 472.
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the injury itself, but it took the circumstances in which it should be applied from Resurfice. 
The Court then had to manipulate the case to enable it to say that the case fell within the 
exception requirements in Resurfice. It did this by saying that the case was similar to Walker 
because it was impossible to prove what a particular person in the causal chain would have 
done had the defendant not committed a negligent act, thus breaking the “but for” chain 
of causation (although this could be said to apply in the majority of cases). The second risk 
requirement was met and so material contribution applied. Before the decision in Resurfice, 
a court would not have had to go to these lengths. The British Columbia Court had to 
engage in legal gymnastics in order to apply the Athey meaning of material contribution. 
The courts had to fit the case before them into the Resurface requirements simply to apply 
the basic historic material contribution test. The result at that point was that the traditional 
test of material contribution to harm was actually more difficult to apply.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal, in the case of Sam v Wilson,107 was able to achieve 
what the Supreme Court had not. It brought some clarity to the legal position. Smith 
JA, who gave the majority judgment, distinguished between the two types of material 
contribution; the material contribution as it was applied in Athey v Leonati and the material 
contribution test applied in Resurfice, the development of the latter principle, having been 
traced by him in B.M. v. British Columbia (Attorney General),108 from its inception in McGhee 
through to Fairchild. Although Smith JA stated that the Resurfice material contribution test 
is not a test of causation at all but rather a rule of law based on policy, he nevertheless 
accepted it as a valid exception to the “but for” test in specific circumstances; when it is 
impossible for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s negligent conduct caused the 
plaintiff’s injury using the “but for” test, where it is clear that the defendant breached a 
duty of care owed to the plaintiff thereby exposing the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of 
injury, and where the plaintiff’s injury falls within the ambit of the risk.
Another decision of the Supreme Court that touched on causation is Fullowka v Royal 
Oak Ventures Inc.109 Unfortunately, it lacked the clarity of Sam v Wilson. The causation issue 
was admittedly not the main issue;110 nevertheless, the Court did have to deal with it. 
Cromwell J, who gave the judgment of the Court, did not seem to appreciate the historical 
confusion that the Supreme Court has created because he actually referred to Resurfice as 
clarifying the law of causation. He simply reiterated that decision, so that in the view of the 
Supreme Court there are two tests for causation; the “but for” test and the Resurfice material 
contribution test. Thus, the two meanings of material contribution remain, though not 
currently recognised by the Supreme Court. The Athey v Leonati material contribution to 
harm lies dormant. The material increase in risk test was at that time a genuine alternative 
to the “but for” test in the right circumstances. Whilst the highest civil court in the United 
Kingdom was rueing the day Fairchild was decided, the Canadian Courts were shambling 
along with the new increased risk test by virtue of the confusion and misunderstanding on 
the part of the Supreme Court.
Then the Supreme Court decided Clements (Litigation Guardian of) v Clements.111 The 
Chief Justice took the opportunity to eliminate the confusion that had been created in the 
107 Sam v Wilson 2007 BCCA 622.
108 B.M. v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2004 BCCA 402, 31 B.C.L.R. (4th) 61.
109 Fullowka v Royal Oak Ventures Inc (2010) 315 DLR (4th) 577 (SCC).
110 The main issue was the existence of duties of care and their breach.
111 Clements (Litigation Guardian of) v Clements 2012 SCC 32.  
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Resurfice case. The case of Clements involved a husband and wife, where the wife sustained 
severe traumatic brain injury as a result of falling off a motorbike that she was riding 
pillion with her husband. The road was wet from the rain. The motorbike was 100 pounds 
overloaded. Unbeknown to the couple, there was a nail in the rear tyre. The husband 
accelerated and began to overtake another vehicle.
The nail came out of the rear tyre, which deflated, causing the motorbike to wobble. 
The husband lost control of the bike. The issue was whether the wife could establish that 
the husband’s actions in overloading the bike and driving too fast had caused her accident. 
The evidence could not establish that the accident would not have occurred but for the 
husband’s negligence. The nail and the deflation of the tyre may themselves have been 
enough to have caused the accident.
McLachlin CJC managed to bring the case within the “but for” test by applying that 
test in a “robust common sense fashion”,112 as it was applied, she said, by Sopinka J in Snell. 
Her approach came suspiciously close to accepting a material increase in risk as a sufficient 
causal connection, through the back door. She was, however, clear in her judgment that it 
is simply a common sense application of the “but for” rule. She then went on to describe 
when the material increase in risk test will apply and managed even to explain the basis 
for the material increase in risk test, as formulated in Resurfice, still in terms of the “but for” 
test, “viewed globally”.113 The case of Sienkiewicz, McLachlin declared, is not to be followed 
in Canada. Accordingly, she could confidently assert that the “but for” test was still the 
main rule on causation in Canada, avoiding any criticism of the type to which the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court has been subjected. Her loose application of the “but for” test 
and the re-explaining of the basis for the decision of Athey v Leonati, and Walker, however, 
require further comment.
McLachlin CJC began by asserting that the “but for” test must be applied in a robust 
common sense fashion and referred to Lord Bridge in Wilsher and Snell in support of this. 
As part of this, a common sense inference of “but for” causation “usually flows without 
difficulty”.114 As a result, she said, the evidence may allow the judge to infer that the 
negligence probably caused the loss, and she again relied on Snell and Athey. However, 
as discussed above, Sopinka J drawing of an inference from the circumstances, and the 
defendant being unable to lead evidence to the contrary, was indeed the common sense 
application by Sopinka J of the “but for” test, but it arguably amounted to the same as an 
increase in risk creating an inference of causation. And although the approach in Snell was 
confirmed in Athey v Leonati, as discussed above, in that case, the material contribution to 
harm test was applied. It was not necessary to draw any inference of causation from the 
evidence.
McLachlin recognised the two different terms, “material contribution to the injury” and 
“material contribution to risk”, but she did not recognise that they have different meanings. 
She said that whilst cases and scholars have referred to both, “material contribution to 
risk” is the more accurate formulation.115 So McLachlin CJC completely disregarded the 
difference in meaning of the two tests and therefore disregarded the role that material 
112 Clements per McLachlin CJC at para. 9.
113 Clements per McLachlin CJC at para. 40.
114 Clements per McLachlin CJC at para. 10.
115 Clements per McLachlin CJC at para. 15.
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contribution to the harm has played in causation to that point. According to her, Athey is an 
application of the “but for” test because although it was a material contribution (to harm) 
approach that was used by Major J, “read in context”116 that did not detract from the fact 
that it was an application of the “but for” test. So the 25% contribution was in effect enough 
to satisfy the “but for” test. 
She also said that Walker was an example of causation in the usual sense, though again, as 
discussed above, Walker actually applied the material contribution to harm approach. Snell 
was taken to be a robust and common sense application of the “but for” test. Her summary 
was that although the Supreme Court recognised that there may be special circumstances 
where material contribution to risk may be a valid approach to causation, the Supreme 
Court has never had to resort to this because it has always applied a robust and common 
sense “but for” test (for this translate – an inference drawn from the evidence). She could 
only say this, though, because she had glossed over the Supreme Court decisions that she 
refers to. If Snell really was a common sense application of the “but for” test, then common 
sense application must mean a loose application of the “but for” test to the point where its 
true meaning is ignored. Snell was a Wilsher type case – if the “but for” test had properly 
been applied, the court could not have found for the plaintiff.
Having established that every relevant Supreme Court case has applied the “but 
for” test, McLachlin CJC completed the Resurfice test of material contribution to risk, 
establishing the “but for” basis of that test and when in the future that test will apply. The 
test will be available when there are a number of possible tortfeasors. All are at fault, but 
it is impossible to say which in particular caused the injury. However, one or more has 
in fact caused the plaintiff’s injury. Viewed globally, the “but for” test is met because the 
plaintiff would not have been injured “but for” their negligence. She explained Sienkiewicz 
as the only case where material contribution to risk was applied to a single tortfeasor case 
(she did not mention Barker at all) and that the United Kingdom felt bound by precedent 
to apply the approach to that type of case. Canada she stated, has no reason to adopt this 
approach to single tortfeasors. She continued: 
The foregoing discussion leads me to the following conclusions as to the present 
state of the law in Canada: 
(1) As a general rule, a plaintiff cannot succeed unless she shows as a matter of fact 
that she would not have suffered the loss “but for” the negligent act or acts of the 
defendant. A trial judge is to take a robust and pragmatic approach to determining if 
a plaintiff has established that the defendant’s negligence caused her loss. Scientific 
proof of causation is not required.
(2) Exceptionally, a plaintiff may succeed by showing that the defendant’s conduct 
materially contributed to the risk of the plaintiff’s injury, where (a) the plaintiff 
has established that her loss would not have occurred “but for” the negligence of 
two or more tortfeasors, each possibly in fact responsible for the loss; and (b) the 
plaintiff, through no fault of her own, is unable to show that any one of the possible 
tortfeasors in fact was the necessary or “but for” cause of her injury, because each 
116 Clements per McLachlin CJC at para. 23.
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can point to one another as the possible “but for” cause of the injury, defeating a 
finding of causation on a balance of probabilities against anyone.117
Applying this to the case before her, the trial judge she said, used language that was 
“tantamount” to finding “but for” causation. He found that the husband’s speed and 
overloading of the bike materially contributed to the injuries of the wife. So McLachlin 
CJC equated material contribution of harm to the “but for” test. This loose application of 
the “but for” test encompassed the material contribution to harm test. The Supreme Court 
ostensibly at least, followed Snell and Athey and so followed principle and precedent and 
even the special rule which allowed a material increase in risk alone to satisfy causation, is 
based on the “but for” test “viewed globally”.
Lebel J dissenting, questioned how even a robust common sense inference that the 
breaches of duty caused the accident could be drawn on the basis of the findings of fact 
of the trial judge. It has to be said that the McLachlin CJC approach seems to stretch the 
“but for” test beyond it capabilities even taking into account that there did not need to 
be scientific evidence of the precise contribution the defendant’s negligence made to the 
injury. 
On the face of it, there can be little criticism of a Supreme Court who applies the 
traditional rules of causation in a common sense way. On paper the Court is applying well 
established principle. However, this common sense application of the “but for” test can in 
effect amount to an acceptance that a material contribution to the harm that is only just 
over de minimis, or even an increase in the risk, can meet that “but for” test. Is this covert 
relaxation of causal rules a better approach than the transparent creation in the United 
Kingdom of an exception to the general rule? In the United Kingdom the circumstances 
where special causal rules are to apply have been openly and clearly explained. Arguably 
the legal basis for the United Kingdom’s current exception is tenuous. A common sense 
application of the “but for” test, on the other hand, which allows an inference of causation 
to be drawn from the evidence, is arguably more inconsistent in result /effect because it is 
completely without boundaries and is subjective. Yet it is more consistent in law because it 
constitutes the repeated application of the “but for” test to all cases, and therefore on paper 
is unimpeachable. It is arguably more consistent with the rule of law, where all are to be 
treated equally before the law. We can perhaps see the same approach with the doubles 
the risk test in the United Kingdom. Latterly it has been treated as satisfying the “but for” 
test rather than being an alternative to it.118 Perhaps the courts are realising this is the way 
to bring in relaxed causal requirements; embrace them as in effect satisfying the traditional 
tests by relaxing the application of the traditional test itself, by applying the traditional 
test(s) in a common sense way.
In Australia the courts also adopted a common sense approach to causation and 
allowed evidence of an increase in risk to inform the drawing of an inference. But the level 
of increase in risk that has been accepted as informing such an inference has varied. 
117 Clements per McLachlin CJC at para. 46.
118 See above in the Scotland and England section, in particular the Novartis case and the Jones case. 
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AUSTRALIA
The common law principles applicable to causation in Australia are generally laid out in 
March v Stramare119 and Bennett v Minister of Community Welfare.120 The majority in March 
held that a common sense approach was to be taken to causation. Deane J stated: “… 
whether conduct is a ‘cause’ of injury remains to be determined by a value judgment 
involving ordinary notions of language and common sense”.121
The “but for” test may be an aid to determine causation but it was not the definitive test. 
According to Mason CJ, the results of its application “must be tempered by the making of 
value judgments and the infusion of policy considerations”.122 McHugh J, who dissented, 
felt that the problem with common sense notions of causation was that “common sense” 
was actually subjective and in fact was actually a policy choice. He felt that the “but 
for” test should be the exclusive test except where there were two or more separate and 
independent causes each of which was sufficient to cause the damage.
The case of Chapel v Hart123 highlighted the subjective nature of the common sense 
approach to causation. Each member of the Court applied the common sense approach, 
but the majority and those dissenting came up with different answers.  In Chapel a doctor 
performed surgery with due skill and care, but he had not warned the patient that there 
was a risk of injury to her voice, despite the patient asking the doctor about possible risks of 
the surgery. The oesophagus was perforated during the operation and there was infection, 
with the result that the patient’s voice was impaired. The patient would have required the 
surgery at some point, but she argued that had she been warned of the risk in question, she 
would have delayed the surgery and had it performed by the most experienced surgeon 
in the field. It was held that the doctor’s negligent failure to advise the patient of the risk 
of physical injury materially contributed to the injury. The majority took the view that the 
chances of the perforation and infection happening were slim such that the chances of this 
happening on another occasion were almost non-existent. The dissenting judges took the 
view that the risk of the perforation and infection was the same whoever did the operation 
and whenever it was done, as it was not a result of negligence; therefore the failure to 
advise of the risk did not materially contribute to the injury.
However, the common sense approach to causation continues to be applied in 
Australia in areas governed by the common law principles of causation.124 It has given 
the assessment of causation in Australia a degree of flexibility which would not otherwise 
119 March v Stramare 171 CLR 506.
120 Bennett v Minister of Community Welfare 107 ALR 617. In most states the burden of proof remains at all 
times with the plaintiff – see March v Stramare; Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352 and Flounders v Millar 2007 
WL 5111402; [2007] NSWCA 238. In  Western Australia, the defendant has an evidential burden where a prima 
facie causal connection is made out by the plaintiff, (which occurs when the plaintiff demonstrates that a breach 
of duty has occurred followed by injury within the area of foreseeable risk). The defendant has an evidential 
burden to lead evidence that the breach had no effect or that the injury would have occurred even if the duty 
had been performed. If the prima facie case is displaced, the plaintiff has to show that the injury was caused by 
the defendant’s negligence. See Steytler P and McLure JA in Amaca Pty Ltd v Hannell [2007] WASCA 158.   
121 March v Stramare per Deane J at 524.
122 March v Stramare per Mason CJ at 516.
123 Chapel v Hart 195 CLR 232.
124 See for example the Australian High Court decision of Roads and Traffic Authority v Royal 2008 WL 2030897; 
[2008] HCA 19, and in particular  per Kirby JJ (though dissenting) for a review of the main authorities on 
causation. See also Ipp JA in Flounders v Millar 2007 WL 5111402; [2007] NSWCA 238. 
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have been possible. It has allowed judges, on a case by case basis, to take into the whole 
causation equation an increase in the risk of harm without departing from the basic 
orthodox principles. Furthermore, although the common sense approach and the “but for” 
test are the mainstay of causation in Australia, evidence to establish that the negligent act 
made a material contribution to the loss was taken to be sufficient to establish causation 
in the Australian High Court case of Bennett v Minister of Community Welfare.125 So too 
in the case of Chapel v Hart.126 It continues to be sufficient to establish causation127 and 
is recognised as distinct from the “but for” test. This combination of a common sense 
approach to causation and a material contribution being sufficient to establish causation 
has meant that an increase in risk at least in the state courts has played an informal part 
in establishing causation when gaps in science have left gaps in the evidence.128 Although 
on the face of it the Australian courts apply relatively orthodox principles of causation, 
this has not completely prevented plaintiffs who meet evidential problems due to gaps in 
scientific knowledge from recovering compensation. 
The initial straightforward application of orthodox principles to cases of mesothelioma 
can be seen in the New South Wales case of Bendix Mintex v Barnes,129 where the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the causal test that had to be established 
on a balance of probabilities was that the defendants caused or materially contributed to 
the mesothelioma. Bonnington Castings and March v Stramare were applied. The Court said 
that this test was not met by establishing that a particular matter could not be excluded as 
a possible cause of the injury. The majority felt that the medical evidence did not support a 
finding that the asbestos exposure due to the defendants’ negligence caused or materially 
contributed to the claimant contracting mesothelioma. Mason P stated that the position in 
Australia at that time was that the law did not equate the situation where the defendant 
had materially increased the risk of injury with one where he had materially contributed 
to the injury. In that particular case, the evidence suggested that the period of employment 
with the Royal Navy had created the greater risk of the claimant contracting mesothelioma 
than any of the other employers, but the Royal Navy was not a defendant in the case.
The courts in New South Wales then, rather than creating a special causation rule for 
these types of cases, began to accept particular forms of expert evidence that allowed the 
court to hold that the negligent exposure to asbestos fibres contributed to the triggering of 
the cancerous process.130 For example, in the case of E M Baldwin & Son Pty Ltd v Plane,131 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales Court of Appeal applied the same causation test, 
but this time found that there was medical evidence led to support the claimant. Fitzgerald 
AJA emphasised that common sense, experience, and policy considerations should be part 
of the causation assessment, relying on March v Stramare. He seemed to say that although 
125 Bennett v Minister of Community Welfare (1992) 176 CLR 408.
126 Chapel v Hart 195 CLR 232. See also McHugh J in Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459. For application of 
material contribution see Duyvelshaff v Cathcart & Ritchie Ltd (1973) 47 ALJR 410; 1 ALR 125.
127 See for example the Australian High Court decision of Roads and Traffic Authority v Royal 2008 WL 2030897; 
[2008] HCA 19.
128 For further discussion of this see below. For the position of the High Court of Australia see further below.
129 Bendix Mintex v Barnes [1997] 42 NSWLR 307.
130 Jane Stapleton, “Factual Causation and Asbestos Cancers”, Law Quarterly Review, CXXVII (2010), p. 355. For 
a recent example see the decision of the Supreme Court of  New South Wales in the case of Amaba Pty v Booth 
2010 WL 5079458; [2010] NSWCA 344, which has been upheld by the High Court. 
131 E M Baldwin & Son Pty Ltd v Plane [1999] NSWCA 130.
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the test is that the wrongdoing must cause or make a material contribution to the harm, 
all relevant circumstances must be considered. This included an increase in the risk to the 
plaintiff from the defendant’s breach of duty. In this case, there was a more equal risk that 
the two defendants’ exposure of asbestos to the claimant had caused the mesothelioma. 
So although the law applied on the face of it seemed to be the same as in Bendix, the 
evaluation of the evidence brought a more favourable result. 
In New South Wales the President of the Dust Diseases Tribunal has expressed the view 
in the case of Stavar v Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd132 that all exposure to asbestos in an 
acceptable latency period makes a material contribution to the disease and that this view 
was now beyond controversy. His decision was appealed on other points but not on this 
conclusion. This meant that in New South Wales a plaintiff can establish causation even 
where the exposure to asbestos that the defendant was responsible for is relatively low.133 
In Amaba Pty v Booth134 the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales 
upheld the application of the material contribution test and a finding on the evidence that 
exposure to asbestos fibres had materially contributed to the plaintiff’s mesothelioma. Risk 
played an important part in the evidence that was accepted by the court in this decision 
and this decision has been upheld by the High Court of Australia.135  
Outside New South Wales, although material contribution is still sufficient to establish 
causation, courts have sometimes found that the exposure to asbestos has not been enough 
to amount to a material contribution.136 An increase in the risk of contracting the disease, 
relative to the background risk, and where that risk eventuates, is relevant. It can be taken 
into account, along with other factors, to draw an inference that the particular wrongful 
exposure caused or materially contributed to the injury. This was the view taken by Martin 
CJ in the Western Australian case of Amaca Pty Ltd v Hannell.137 In his opinion if the Relative 
Risk138 was 2 or over, that can be taken into account, along with other evidence, that the 
particular exposure caused or materially contributed to the disease. He relied heavily on 
Spigelman CJ in Seltsam v McGuiness139 a case of non-mesothelioma cancer. Mr. Hannell 
had only experienced low level non-occupational exposure to respirable asbestos fibres 
other than background exposure experienced by the general population. The evidence was 
that the Relative Risk was calculated at between 1.3-1.4. Martin CJ felt this was not enough 
to say that the wrongful exposures made a material contribution to the mesothelioma. 
However, the majority of the Court (Steytler P and McLure JA) found that in this case, 
unlike in Seltsam, there was a direct and admitted relationship between the risk of harm 
giving rise to the breach and the particular injury suffered. The only question was whether 
132 Stavar v Caltex Refineries (NSW) Pty Ltd [2008] NSWDDT 22.
133 See Jane Stapleton, note 130 above, p. 351 and McNeill v Seltsam Pty Ltd [2005] NSWDDT 4,  referred to in 
that article. This case was successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of  New South 
Wales ( see Seltsam Pty Ltd v McNeill 2006 WL 1731456; [2006] NSWCA 158) but on the argument that there was 
no duty of care owed in the circumstances. The Court stated in its judgment that it would not have upheld the 
grounds of appeal relating to causation  if disposition of them had been necessary.  
134 Amaca Pty v Booth  2010 WL 5079458; [2010] NSWCA 344.
135 Amaca Pty v Booth  246 CLR 36.
136 See Jane Stapleton, note 130 above, p. 351 and case of Amaca Pty Ltd v Moss [2007] WASCA 162 referred to 
in that article.
137 Amaca Pty Ltd v Hannell [2007] WASCA 158.
138 Relative Risk (“RR”) is defined as the ratio of the incidence of disease in exposed individuals compared to 
the incidence in unexposed individuals.
139 Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262.
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one or the other or both sources of asbestos caused or materially contributed to the injury.140 
They saw the two sources of asbestos fibres, on the basis of evidence led, to be cumulative 
rather than alternative causes. The majority application of the scientific evidence was as 
follows:
As previously noted, the expert evidence is to the effect that asbestos fibres 
directly and indirectly produce DNA damage in mesothelial cells some of which 
cells survive the body’s defence mechanisms and, over a very lengthy period, 
the damage in turn produces gene mutations some of which are dangerous and, 
in combination with other processes, cause disordered growth resulting in the 
contraction of mesothelioma. Inhaled asbestos from exposures within the long 
latency period each contribute to sufficient accumulated DNA damage which is a 
precondition to the contraction of the disease. Thus, asbestos fibres from all sources 
make a cumulative contribution to the contraction of the disease. The next question 
is whether the contribution is material. That can be assessed by reference to the 
quantitative assessment of the respective levels of asbestos fibre contribution. Based 
on Dr Francis’ assessment of the dose of asbestos likely to have been inhaled by 
the respondent from the specific exposures and Professor Berry’s calculation of the 
RR at between 1.3 and 1.4, that would on any view be a material contribution to 
the contraction of the disease. A RR at 1.14 which involves a mortality increase 
of one person per hundred thousand from a background level of six per hundred 
thousand would also qualify as a material contribution to the contraction of the 
disease.141 
The majority found a prima facie case that the specific exposures caused the respondent’s 
mesothelioma.142 The appeal by the defendants was in fact successful but on the issue of 
the existence of a duty of care, not causation. The majority were willing to accept that 
the specific exposure had made a material contribution to the injury even though there 
was a low level of exposure. In the similar case of Amaca Pty Ltd v Moss however, the 
same composition of the Supreme Court of Western Australia felt that an even lower 
specific exposure than in Hannell, could not be said to have been a materially contributing 
factor. The Relative Risk was calculated to be somewhere between 1.004-1.006, which was 
recognised as a particularly low exposure to asbestos relative to background risk.
This approach of the lower Australian Courts – where there is an acceptance of various 
exposures to asbestos as being a cumulative cause of mesothelioma and where risk 
informs the assessment of a material contribution – has been accepted by the High Court of 
Australia in Booth. Booth brought an action against two companies who had manufactured 
most of the brake linings on which he had worked. Booth had three other brief exposures 
to asbestos other than these wrongful exposures, including one as a child. The “innocent” 
exposures were as a result of home renovations and truck loading. The trial judge in Booth 
found that all exposure to chrysotile asbestos other than trivial or de minimis exposure 
materially contributed to mesothelioma. He accepted evidence that the single fibre theory 
was discredited. The majority of the High Court accepted the material contribution to 
injury test as valid on the basis of the evidence that had been accepted by the trial judge.
140 Hannell per Steytler P and McLure JA at para. 387. 
141 Hannell per Steytler P and McLure JA at para. 415. 
142 See note 120 above regarding Western Australia’s burden of proof. 
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The reasoning of French CJ was as follows – an explanatory causal mechanism was 
proposed by expert medical evidence. There was therefore a causal connection between 
the wrongdoing and the injury, although other causative factors “may have played a part”. 
That causal connection was inferred by an expert in the relevant field considering the nature 
and incidents of the correlation. This inference drawn by the expert can include reference 
to relative risk ratio as an indicator of the strength of the association. This inference can 
itself support an inference, drawn by the judge in the particular case, when injury has 
actually taken place, that the defendant’s conduct was a cause of the injury. French CJ 
referred to Dixon J in Betts v Whittingslowe,143 who said that an inference of causation can 
be drawn from the breach of duty; the fact the injury occurred and in the absence of any 
sufficient reason to the contrary. Therefore in French CJ’s reasoning, an inference drawn 
by an expert on the evidence can itself support an inference drawn by the judge on the 
“facts” of that particular case.
A modified concept of causation as was adopted in Fairchild was not required because 
the cumulative effect mechanism was accepted by the trial judge in Booth and so the 
material contribution test could be met. Gummow, Hayne, and Crennan JJ in their separate 
judgement recognised that the material contribution to injury test was valid in this type of 
case, distinguishing it from the case of Amaca Pty Ltd v Ellis144 which the High Court had 
dealt with just the year before, but which had involved alternative causes and the plaintiff 
there had not shown that exposure to asbestos had made a material contribution to his 
lung cancer. Heydon J, dissenting, argued that risk and cause had been conflated both 
in the expert evidence accepted by the trial judge and also by the trial judge himself. The 
“but for” test was not satisfied, he pointed out. There was, surprisingly, little discussion by 
any of the High Court Justices of the common sense approach to causation. However, the 
High Court in this decision, at least in relation to mesothelioma cases, is clearly allowing 
risk to inform causation through the material contribution to injury test and the drawing 
of an inference.
This is not how the science has been interpreted in Britain. The Australian approach 
allows the material contribution test to deal with cases of mesothelioma caused by asbestos 
exposure. The line of reasoning goes something like this – multiple exposures to asbestos 
have a cumulative effect on the development of the disease because the more exposure 
to asbestos there is, the increase in the risk of contraction of the disease, to the extent 
that an inference can be drawn that the wrongful exposures materially contribute to the 
cause of the disease. But in the same way as some have dealt with the issue in the United 
Kingdom (Lord Bingham and Rodger in Fairchild), there is a jump from increase in risk 
to materially contributing to the disease in that particular case. The gap is bridged by the 
inference which is allowed by virtue of the application of common sense. In the United 
Kingdom the Supreme Court, instead of bridging a gap, chose to create a new principle of 
law and created a distinct exception. The courts in Australia have not adopted the Fairchild 
principles in cases of mesothelioma because they have not needed to.  
In cases where asbestos exposure has resulted in lung cancer, as opposed to 
mesothelioma, the State courts have also relied on evidence that they feel has established 
that asbestos has probably contributed to the victim’s lung cancer. In such cases the 
143 Betts v Whittingslowe (1945) 71 CLR 36.
144 Amaca Pty Ltd v Ellis 2010 HCA 5.
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multiple exposures are often of different types. There will be exposure to asbestos, but there 
will be also be something like the plaintiff’s own self-imposed exposure to tobacco. The 
common sense approach to causation that has been such a feature of Australian causation 
has allowed risk to be part of the consideration in these type of cases as well. In Cavanough 
v Workers Compensation (Dust Diseases) Board145the New South Wales Compensation Court 
applied the common sense notion of causation and that the wrongdoing must cause or 
materially contribute to the injury. Although the judge took into account the fact that 
exposure to asbestos increases the risk of lung cancer, he did this in the context of taking 
all evidence into account, including epidemiological evidence and in applying common 
sense, and concluded that the exposure of asbestos made a material contribution to the 
cancer, along with smoking.
The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Seltsam Pty v 
McGuiness also took into account the increase in risk shown in epidemiological evidence 
in their common sense consideration of causation. Such evidence was, according to 
Spigelman CJ, part of strands in a cable in a circumstantial case and can in combination with 
other relevant facts establish an inference that a particular exposure caused or materially 
contributed to the injury. In this particular case, the majority of the court did not find that 
the increase in risk amounted to anything more than a possibility. It has to be probable 
that the risk came home.146 Spigelman CJ referred to the use of Relative Risk by the United 
States courts and said that in Australia, the closer the Relative Risk ratio approaches 2.0, the 
greater the significance that can be attached to the studies for the purposes of drawing an 
inference of causation in an individual case.147 The result was that the majority found that 
on a balance of probabilities the asbestos exposure in this case did not cause or materially 
contribute to the plaintiff’s renal cell cancer. The plaintiff had been a moderate smoker and 
suffered from obesity throughout most of his life. These were the other competing causes 
for his cancer which were generally accepted as having a causal relationship with renal cell 
cancer. In the New South Wales case of Judd v Amaca Pty,148 Curtis J applied the doubles 
the risk test but held that the evidence had not established that the plaintiff’s exposure to 
asbestos had doubled the risk of him contracting lung cancer, and therefore that it was 
more probable in that individual case that the exposure to asbestos had caused the cancer 
either alone or due to the synergistic effect of exposure to asbestos and smoking. 
The High Court decision in Roads and Traffic Authority v Royal149 involved a road traffic 
accident rather than exposure to asbestos, although risk played some role in the arguments 
of the parties.  Causation was discussed in some detail. The Court seemed to downplay the 
role of a simple increase in risk that was beyond a de minimis increase. Kiefel J said this of 
the place of risk in the causative assessment:
The present state of authority does not accept the possibility of risk of injury as 
sufficient to prove causation. It requires that the risk eventuate. Kitto J in Jones v 
Dunkel said that one “does not pass from the realm of conjecture into the realm of 
inference” unless the facts enable a positive finding as to the existence of a specific 
145 Cavanough v Workers Compensation (Dust Diseases) Board [1998] NSWCC 35.
146 See judgement of Spigelman CJ in Seltsam Pty v McGuiness; and also Mason P in Bendix; and Luxton v Vines 
(1952) 85 CLR 352.
147 Seltsam Pty per Spigelman CJ at para. 137. 
148 Judd v Amaca Pty Ltd [2003] NSWDDT 12.
149 Roads and Traffic Authority v Royal 2008 WL 2030897; [2008] HCA 19.
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state of affairs. Spigelman CJ pointed out in Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness, with 
respect to an increased risk of injury, that the question is whether it did cause or 
materially contribute to the injury actually suffered. This enquiry is consistent with 
the commonsense approach required by March.150 
The Supreme Court of South Australia and the Queensland Court of Appeal seem to 
have followed this approach to risk of injury.151 Furthermore, in non-mesothelioma cancer 
cases, where there has been exposure to asbestos fibres, the High Court of Australia has 
rejected the material contribution test where there are alternative possible causes, if the 
epidemiological evidence and thereby the relative risk, is not strong enough to allow an 
inference to be drawn that the exposure to asbestos materially contributed to the cancer. In 
the Supreme Court of Western Australian case of Ellis, the plaintiff had died of lung cancer 
after many years as a smoker but had also experienced relatively low level exposure to 
asbestos fibres. The lung cancer was not one that was peculiarly associated with exposure 
to asbestos and therefore was not indicative of the cause. The two potential causes were 
tobacco smoke and asbestos fibres. The majority of the Supreme Court of Western Australia 
saw this as a case of cumulative multiple causes and applied the Bonnington Castings case 
and material contribution test. It found that the two periods of exposure to asbestos, acting 
in combination with the exposure to tobacco smoke, made a material contribution to the 
development of the tumour. The plaintiff had argued the case on the basis that causation 
was to be decided by applying the “but for” test; there was no argument that an increase 
in risk was sufficient to establish causation. However, she argued that an inference could 
be drawn, on epidemiological evidence, to establish the “but for” test.
In the appeal to the High Court of Australia, the High Court held that the epidemiological 
evidence that was led could not support such an inference. It applied the “but for” test and, 
in the circumstances, rejected the material contribution test. The plaintiff had relied heavily 
on epidemiological evidence. The High Court found that the epidemiological evidence 
was not sufficient to say that the asbestos exposure made a material contribution to the 
lung cancer because an initial connection between Mr. Cotton’s inhaling asbestos and his 
developing cancer was not demonstrated. The High Court in assessing the epidemiological 
evidence found that it was more probable than not that smoking was a cause of (in the sense 
that it was a necessary condition for) Mr. Cotton’s lung cancer. The risks and probabilities 
associated with asbestos, whether alone or in conjunction with smoking, were low, and 
not sufficient to found the inference that it was more probable than not that exposure to 
respirable asbestos fibres was a cause of (a necessary condition for) Mr. Cotton’s cancer. It 
said that material contribution was not a suitable test in this type of case; that of multiple 
exposures of different types. There were two different types of injurious substance from 
different sources and the question was whether one of those injurious substances caused 
injury in this case. The Court contrasts this with the Bonnington Castings type of case where 
the material contribution test originated. This was not a case of asking whether one source 
of the same substance contributed to an accumulation of that substance. 
150 Royal per Kiefel J at para. 144.
151 For the Supreme Court of South Australia see Van Den Heuvel v Tucker (2003) 85 SASR 512; and for the 
Queensland Court of Appeal see Batiste v State of Queensland [2002] 2 Qd R 119. See Ipp JA in Flounders v Millar 
[2007] NSWCA 238.
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The High Court of Australia is therefore sending a clear message to the lower courts 
that material contribution cannot be used to get round the lack of scientific evidence of 
a causal connection between the exposure to a carcinogenic substance and the disease 
suffered. In non-mesothelioma cases this is not a way round causation difficulties. The 
Court does not, however, reject the approach of finding an inference of causation; but it 
states that there does at least have to be clear epidemiological evidence that establishes the 
relative risk or probabilities of the victim developing his cancer from exposure to asbestos 
fibres, whether alone or in combination with smoking, to be higher than with just smoking. 
Risk can therefore still play a part in the causative assessment by virtue of the drawing of 
an inference. It will however be part of the assessment. 
The High Court stated that on top of epidemiological studies of risk and probability, 
the studies relied on must be related to the case in hand. It needs to be shown that the 
particular case before the court conforms to the pattern described by the epidemiological 
studies. The High Court points out that such a step is not inevitable. The High Court 
accepts that without more evidence than simply epidemiological evidence that a small 
percentage of cases of cancer were probably caused by exposure to asbestos, a court would 
not be able to draw an inference of causation in any particular case. This was because 
of the limits of knowledge about what causes cancer. So although there had been no 
argument that the court should leap the evidential gap and use simply the increase in 
risk principle of Fairchild, to establish causation, it is not true to say that the High Court 
took no account of risk in their causative assessment. Risk does not play the same role as 
in mesothelioma cases because of the inapplicability of the cumulative mechanism theory 
as in mesothelioma cases, and thereby the inapplicability of material contribution in the 
mesothelioma sense, because there is more than one agent. However, risk still has a role to 
play in the drawing of an inference and in the application of common sense to causation. 
The High Court of Australia has therefore reigned in the State courts’ looser application 
of orthodox causation principles at least in cases of multiple different causes. A material 
contribution to harm and the “but for” test are distinguishable as separate tests. Common 
sense is to be applied to both, and an inference on the facts may be drawn in either, with 
risk playing an important part in the establishing of that inference. Increase in risk by itself 
has no place in the equation unless a Fairchild argument is being made; that is currently no 
part of Australian law. Consequently, in Australia an increase in risk of harm, although it 
has not been formally adopted as a sufficient test to satisfy causation in itself, can be seen 
to be taken into account when the court is considering whether the exposure has caused or 
materially contributed to the harm. This is done as part of the common sense consideration 
of causation which can allow an inference to be drawn.
CONCLUSION
It is evident that of the three jurisdictions, Canada adopts the loosest application of the 
“but for” test in causation in tort. The Supreme Court in that jurisdiction has included 
as meeting the “but for” test when there is a material contribution to the harm and also, 
effectively, when there is an increase in the risk of harm. Even the formal clearly defined 
exception, where an increase in risk of harm can itself satisfy causation, has been set 
within the “but for” test “viewed globally”. Canada and Australia both emphasise the 
common sense approach, but Australia does distinguish between the “but for” test and the 
material contribution to harm test. Both jurisdictions allow risk to inform the drawing of a 
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factual inference by virtue of a common sense approach, to meet their tests for causation. 
The United Kingdom, just as Australia, distinguishes between the “but for” test and the 
material contribution to harm test, but has chosen to take a more transparent approach to 
situations where a strict application of the “but for” test cannot be met and, in its opinion, 
material contribution is not appropriate. It has defined a particular exception where an 
increase in risk itself will be sufficient to establish causation, but it has, for now, restricted 
this exception to mesothelioma cases. However, there is evidence of the lower courts in the 
United Kingdom beginning to allow risk to inform the “but for” test in non-mesothelioma 
cases through the application of the doubles the risk test, which is being taken to satisfy 
the “but for” test. 
In the cases following Barker and the Compensation Act 2006, had the United Kingdom 
restricted the risk exception to Fairchild and McGhee type cases, on the basis of something 
like the global “but for” justification that the Supreme Court in Canada has formulated, 
there might have been a greater acceptability of increased risk informing causation in 
other types of difficult evidential cases, where increased risk could be considered, along 
with other factors, to allow an inference of causation to be drawn within orthodox rules, 
in appropriate cases. 
In Australian mesothelioma cases the material contribution test has allowed increased 
risk to form part of the consideration for the drawing of an inference to bridge the gap 
to establish causation. In non-mesothelioma cases, where there are a number of possible 
causes a mere increase in risk that is just beyond de minimis is not enough to allow an 
inference to be drawn to establish causation. An increase in risk can be relevant but needs 
to be significant enough to show, along with any other relevant factors, a probable link 
between the disease and the wrongdoing. If the relative risk is double, this will allow an 
inference to be drawn. 
The Canadian and Australian looser approach where the orthodox rules allow risk 
to play a role is a more legally consistent approach because the same rule is applied to 
all parties. The inconsistency lies in the effect or result because by their nature the rules 
are so pliable (particularly in Canada) as to give the judges considerable scope for their 
own subjective views and for policy to play a large role. Greater justice can be achieved 
in individual cases, but outcomes can be difficult to determine. The United Kingdom 
approach provides clarity in practice because the exception to the strict application of the 
orthodox rule is clearly defined and consistently applied. In law however, the approach 
is not coherent because the exception that has been carved out has not been adequately 
justified in law. The United Kingdom approach also entails a lack of flexibility in future 
cases where similar evidential difficulties may arise that do not involve mesothelioma. 
This means that individual justice is more difficult to achieve. 
As technology has developed, so too has the array of toxic chemicals to which 
individuals are exposed. As our medical and scientific knowledge increases and becomes 
more sophisticated, our understanding of the aetiology of diseases and respective 
“causes” of injuries has also improved. Sometimes this actually highlights how much 
we still do not know about certain diseases. But with this increase in knowledge and the 
remaining gaps in our scientific knowledge comes a realisation that a strict application of 
traditional approaches to causation in personal injury cases cannot deal adequately with 
delictual/tortious wrongs that result in such injuries and disease, in the sense of carrying 
out the primary roles of tort/delict of compensation and deterrence, and the provision of 
justice. The Honourable Justice Beverley McLachlin, back in the 1980s, recognised that 
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there would need to be a greater flexibility in the rules on causation to deal with modern 
expectations.152 Her judgment in Clements gives the United Kingdom food for thought, as 
does the approach in the Australian courts. 
152 Justice Beverley McLachlin, in Mullany and Linden, note76 above, p. 34.
